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ARTICLES
MEDICAL HARM WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE
Valerie Gutmann Koch*
In December 2019, seven women from one family underwent highly
invasive surgeries based on genetic test results that indicated that each were
at significant risk of developing cancer by age seventy. Subsequently, after
procedures that (among other things) permanently scarred and disfigured
their bodies and ended their chances of having biological children, they
learned that their particular mutation was not, in fact, pathogenic.
This Article focuses on a previously under-recognized problem: what
happens when a patient’s previously classified pathogenic variant is
downgraded to uncertain (or even benign) status? Intuitively, it might seem
that the genetic testing company, the surgeons, or others who participated in
or influenced the family’s decisions should be liable. However, while there
is demonstrable harm, no one was negligent. This Article contextualizes the
“harm without negligence” problem within the universe of medical harms
more generally. It explores a pervasive—but often unrecognized—problem
in medicine: harms arise when individuals act in the wake of uncertainty,
and common-law negligence rules and current regulations fall short. It
concludes by identifying potential tort, regulatory, and intellectual property
answers, recognizing that a problem seemingly grounded in tort law may
instead have regulatory or other solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2019, Katy Mathes and six women in her family elected to
undergo mastectomies and/or to have their ovaries removed after receiving
genetic test results indicating that each had an 84 percent chance of
developing cancer by age seventy.1 Subsequently, after these invasive
surgeries and procedures that (among other things) permanently scarred and
disfigured their bodies and ended their chances of having more biological
children, they learned that their test results signaling a BRCA mutation,
which had been obtained from a physician-ordered testing company called
Myriad Genetics, had been “downgraded.”2 Rather than being pathogenic
(and therefore potentially deadly), the mutation was reclassified as a variant
of unknown significance (VUS)—meaning that the clinical significance was

1. See Amy Dockser Marcus, A Genetic Test Led Seven Women in One Family to Have
Major Surgery. Then the Odds Changed., WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2019, 11:43 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/seven-women-in-a-family-chose-surgery-after-a-genetic-testthen-the-results-changed-11576860210 [https://perma.cc/FHR2-N2DD].
2. See id.
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uncertain—rendering the highly invasive procedures they underwent
contraindicated and unnecessary.3
Genetic variant classification and reclassification is inherently
confusing—to patients and physicians alike. Commercial laboratories and
diagnostic companies themselves sometimes disagree on how to classify a
particular variant,4 rendering some test results particularly unreliable.5
Despite appearances, even when a patient receives medical test results, these
results may not always be reliable or actionable. Not all medical tests, and
not all medical test results, are created equal. Ambiguous and changing
genetic test results can exacerbate uncertainty in medical decision-making
and, in some cases, lead to misguided and contraindicated medical
interventions. Individuals who receive genetic test results may feel
pressure—internal and external—to undergo prophylactic surgeries that may
subsequently be deemed needless. According to one study, 10 to 15 percent
of women with pathogenic variants/VUS in genes not associated with a high
risk of ovarian cancer still reported undergoing oophorectomies without a
clear indication of ovarian cancer.6 In short, more information does not
always mean more certainty in medical decision-making.
Intuitively, it might seem that Myriad, the surgeons, or others who
participated in the Mathes family’s decisions to undergo surgical
interventions based on the formerly pathogenic test results should be liable.
The women underwent aggressive surgeries, had painful and prolonged
recoveries, and experienced long-term health sequelae.7 They each made
irreversible, life-altering medical decisions in reliance on their original test
results—decisions they likely would not have made had they learned of their
lower risk sooner.
But no one was negligent. The company based its classification
determinations on up-to-date criteria and evolving evidence.8 Likewise, the
3. See id.
4. See Sharon E. Plon, Diana M. Eccles, Douglas Easton, William D. Foulkes, Maurizio
Genuardi, Marc S. Greenblatt, Frans B.L. Hogervorst, Nicole Hoogerbrugge, Amanda B.
Spurdle & Sean Tavtigian, Sequence Variant Classification and Reporting:
Recommendations for Improving the Interpretation of Cancer Susceptibility Genetic Test
Results, 29 HUM. MUTATION 1282, 1285 (2008) (describing different protocols that diagnostic
laboratories use to classify and report information on variants).
5. In fact, a working group at the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics
(ACMG) recommended against reporting variants of unknown significance to patients,
recognizing “the challenge of attempting to report and interpret variants of unknown
significance as incidental findings.” Robert C. Green, Jonathan S. Berg, Wayne W. Grody,
Sarah S. Kalia, Bruce R. Korf, Christa L. Martin, Amy McGuire, Robert L. Nussbaum,
Julianne M. O’Daniel, Kelly E. Ormond, Heidi L. Rehm, Michael S. Watson, Marc S.
Williams & Leslie G. Biesecker, ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental
Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 565, 567 (2013).
6. See Susan M. Domchek, Jamie Brower, Heather Symecko, Vanessa Marcell, Michael
Francis Walsh, Jada G. Hamilton, Fergus Coach, Kenneth Offit, Judy Ellen Garber & Mark
E. Robson, Uptake of Oophorectomy in Women with Findings on Multigene Panel Testing:
Results from the Prospective Registry of Multiplex Testing (PROMPT), 38 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 1508, 1508 (2020).
7. See Marcus, supra note 1.
8. See id.
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Mathes family’s doctors presumably performed the surgeries and provided
care based on current evidence and pursuant to the accepted standard of care.9
In short, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that a duty to
these individuals had been breached, or that their injuries were caused by the
company’s or doctors’ negligent actions. Thus, no clear negligence claim
exists in the reclassification of genetic information based on sound scientific
information. But there is demonstrable harm.
Recent revelations of false positive results from physician-ordered genetic
testing products, particularly in the context of severe diseases such as
hereditary breast and ovarian cancers, raise significant questions about fault,
compensation, and oversight. Individuals who receive information about
their genetic predispositions—even if that information is correct at the time
it is shared—are left to make incredibly difficult and complex decisions.
Under current legal norms, when that information is unclear or later
discovered to be wrong, they may suffer incompensable harms—both
physical and psychosocial.
This Article addresses a question that has been largely undiscussed in legal
scholarship: what happens when a patient’s previously classified pathogenic
variant is downgraded to uncertain (or even benign)? It explores the legal
implications of gene reclassification and the harms that arise when
individuals act in the wake of uncertainty, an area where common-law
negligence rules and current regulations fall short.10
Current norms effectively punish those who take medical action based on
genetic tests for being proactive in the face of uncertainty. Individuals who
undergo medical and surgical interventions in response to genetic test results
do so based on thoughtful analysis and personal experience. Many have
witnessed loved ones suffer from the same disease for which they have just
received a positive test result. Thus, these individuals undergo prophylactic
interventions not out of ignorance or as knee-jerk reactions. An alternative
to being proactive—waiting for the most accurate results—could result in
disease and even more costly medical care.11
9. See Jessica L. Roberts & Alexandra L. Foulkes, Genetic Duties, 62 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 143, 162–74 (2020) (noting that the elements of duty and breach may not be met in cases
of genetic variant reclassification).
10. This inquiry does not just implicate whether individuals are able to be autonomous
decision-makers; it also raises equity concerns. Researchers have demonstrated significant
racial and ethnic disparity in VUS due to historical inequities in genetic research. See Allison
W. Kurian, Kevin C. Ward, Ann S. Hamilton, Dennis M. Deapen, Paul Abrahamse, Irina
Bondarenko, Yun Li, Sarah T. Hawley, Monica Morrow, Reshma Jagsi & Steven J. Katz,
Uptake, Results, and Outcomes of Germline Multiple-Gene Sequencing After Diagnosis of
Breast Cancer, 4 JAMA ONCOLOGY 1066, 1069–70 (2018).
11. There is a growing amount of literature devoted to the uncertainty associated with
patient decision-making after receiving classifications of variants of unknown significance.
See, e.g., Lily Hoffman-Andrews, The Known Unknown: The Challenges of Genetic Variants
of Uncertain Significance in Clinical Practice, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 648 (2017); Jenny
Chang, Sirivan Seng, June Yoo, Pamela Equivel & Sharon S. Lum, Clinical Management of
Patients at Risk for Hereditary Breast Cancer with Variants of Unknown Significance in the
Era of Multigene Panel Testing, 26 ANNALS SURGICAL ONCOLOGY 3389 (2019); Julie O.
Culver, C.D. Brinkerhoff, Jessica Clague, K. Yang, Kathryn Elaine Singh, Sharon R. Sand &
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Unlike cases that involve downgrading a VUS to “likely benign” or
“benign,” in which patients are already (presumably) advised not to take
medical action, a pathogenic classification is likely to spur action on the part
of the patient.12 Thus, the circumstances that this Article addresses are
unique because a variant classification of “likely pathogenic” or
“pathogenic” is generally considered clinically actionable, such that a later
downgrading of that classification would indicate that the patient did not need
to undergo those interventions. In other words, VUS classifications are not
intended to inform clinical management,13 while pathogenic classifications
are.14
Importantly, while this Article focuses on a particular set of facts within
the context of genetic testing, the “harm without negligence” problem
pervades health care.15 So often, patients are forced to make life-changing
medical decisions based on imperfect and constantly changing information.
In these situations, patients suffer harm but cannot point to a particular
individual’s fault that caused the injury. Patients have devices implanted that
turn out to be much riskier than originally expected or even clinically
inappropriate.16 Unanticipated adverse events occur after medications have
Jeffrey N. Weitzel, Variants of Unknown Significance in BRCA Testing: Evaluation of
Surgical Decisions, Risk Perception, and Cancer Distress, 84 CLINICAL GENETICS 464 (2013).
12. Scholars have addressed the legal consequences of either downgrading VUS to benign
or upgrading VUS to pathogenic. See generally Roberts & Foulkes, supra note 9; Alexandra
L. Foulkes, Jessica L. Roberts, Paul S. Appelbaum, Wendy K. Chung, Ellen Wright Clayton,
Barbara Evans & Gary E. Marchant, Can Clinical Genetics Laboratories Be Sued for Medical
Malpractice?, 29 ANNALS HEALTH L. LIFE SCI. 153 (2020). However, an original VUS
classification carries no recommended medical action. Classifying a variant as unknown
means just that: the clinical implications of such a classification are unknown.
13. According to the ACMG: “A variant of uncertain significance should not be used in
clinical decision-making. Efforts to resolve the classification of the variant as pathogenic or
benign should be undertaken. While this effort to reclassify the variant is underway, additional
monitoring of the patient for the disorder in question may be prudent.” Sue Richards, Nazneen
Aziz, Sherri Bale, David Bick, Soma Das, Julie Gastier-Foster, Wayne W. Grody, Madhuri
Hegde, Elaine Lyon, Elaine Spector, Karl Voelkerding & Heidi L. Rehm, Standards and
Guidelines for the Interpretation of Sequence Variants: A Joint Consensus Recommendation
of the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics and the Association for Molecular
Pathology, 17 GENETICS MED. 405, 423 (2015).
14. Further, this Article focuses specifically on reclassification of genetic variants for
patients who sought medical information (i.e., a potential diagnosis upon which to act), rather
than reclassification of genetic variants within the research context. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf,
Jordan Paradise & Charlisse Caga-anan, The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects
Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 365–66 (2008)
(exploring the ethical and legal obligations owed to participants in research involving human
subjects).
15. For example, Professor Dov Fox notes that tort law does not compensate for
reproductive harms, and that the regulatory system is woefully inadequate to avoid such
wrongs. See Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 149 (2017)
(“[E]rrors go virtually unchecked in a profession that operates free of meaningful regulation.
Private remedies meanwhile treat reproductive negligence more as trifle than tragedy . . . . But
in the absence of property loss or physical injury, existing law provides little basis to recognize
disrupted family planning as a harm worthy of protection.”).
16. See, e.g., Ed Yong, Clinical Genetics Has a Big Problem That’s Affecting People’s
Lives, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/whyhuman-genetics-research-is-full-of-costly-mistakes/420693/ [https://perma.cc/M2S3-JTU2]
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been taken.17 Physicians recommend surgeries that turn out to be
unnecessary and potentially dangerous.18 It is not uncommon for procedures
or drugs that the medical community views as initially beneficial based on
available evidence to turn out to be either ineffective or even harmful,
causing patients to experience “medical whiplash.”19
In such cases, the patients are the ones who end up paying—physically,
emotionally, and financially. Instead, we need to consider how to apportion
the risks of these harms in a thoughtful and equitable manner. The fact that
patients consented to the intervention should not preclude all recovery when
the patient later learns that the harm they suffered turned out to be
unnecessary. More information does not always ensure a better outcome.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I identifies the challenge of genetic
variant classification and reclassification. Part II focuses on the central
“harm without negligence” problem: that individuals can experience both
physical and psychosocial harms due to the reclassification of genetic
variants, even in the absence of negligence. After considering the bioethical
principles at play, Part III examines the inadequacies in existing tort,
regulatory, and intellectual property regimes and explores potential solutions
to the “harm without negligence” problem in clinical genomics. What
appears to be a problem grounded in tort law may, in fact, have a regulatory
fix. In other words, an ideal solution would reduce the likelihood of harms
occurring in the first place while providing a possibility of recovery for any
injuries that patients sustain. By identifying legal solutions to the harm
individuals suffer in these circumstances, we may, perhaps, simultaneously
incentivize genetic laboratories to ensure the accuracy and clinical validity
and utility of test results, thereby reducing false positives in variant
classification.20

(citing cases of patients who “get monitoring devices surgically implanted in their chests on
the basis of mutations in heart-disease genes”).
17. See, e.g., VINAYAK K. PRASAD & ADAM S. CIFU, ENDING MEDICAL REVERSAL:
IMPROVING OUTCOMES, SAVING LIVES 12 (2015) (describing flecainide, a drug intended to
suppress premature ventricular contractions and which was later found to also increase
patients’ chance of dying).
18. See, e.g., Vinay Prasad, Victor Gall & Adam Cifu, The Frequency of Medical
Reversal, 171 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1675, 1675 (2011) (defining medical reversal as the
“phenomenon of a new trial—superior to predecessors because of better design, increased
power, or more appropriate controls—contradicting current clinical practice”). The authors
offer, as an example, the 2007 Clinical Outcomes Utilizing Revascularization and Aggressive
Drug Evaluation (COURAGE) trial, which “found no benefit to support percutaneous
coronary intervention (vs optimal medical therapy) in many patients with stable coronary
artery disease, an indication that was previously accepted.” Id.
19. Abigail Zuger, Book Review: ‘Ending Medical Reversal’ Laments Flip-Flopping,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/science/book-reviewending-medical-reversal-laments-flip-flopping.html [https://perma.cc/AY4A-662W].
20. See Hunter H. Giles, Madhuri R. Hegde, Elaine Lyon, Christine M. Stanley, Iain D.
Kerr, Megan E. Garlapow & Julie M. Eggington, The Science and Art of Clinical Genetic
Variant Classification and Its Impact on Test Accuracy, 22 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM.
GENETICS 285, 303 (2021).
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I. THE CHALLENGE OF GENETIC CLASSIFICATION AND RECLASSIFICATION
Genetic variants are classified by genetic testing companies to allow
patients, with guidance from their physicians and genetic counselors, to make
informed decisions about future medical care and prevention. However,
because data is collected over time, because technology progresses, and
because information is accumulated, reclassification of some genetic variants
is inherent and inevitable. The utilization of genetic technologies in medicine
has incredible potential for better diagnosis, treatment, and prevention, but it
is constantly evolving. Experts are increasingly recognizing that “[c]linical
genetic variant classification science is hard.”21 This part explains how and
why this is so.
A. Genetic Testing
Since the success of the first draft of the human genome two decades ago,22
genetic testing for disease predisposition has become almost ubiquitous,
particularly for certain cancers. For example, there is a high incidence of
mutations in the BRCA genes for individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish descent,
which may predispose them to a significantly higher risk of breast, ovarian,
and other cancers than the general population.23 Approximately one in ten
breast cancer diagnoses is associated with a pathogenic germline variant, and
more than half of those are mutations of BRCA1 and BRCA2.24 Genetic
testing extends beyond BRCA to other hereditary cancer syndromes,
including Lynch syndrome, Cowden syndrome, Li-Fraumeni syndrome,
CDH1 mutations, and multiple endocrine neoplasia type 2,25 as well as
hereditary diseases besides cancer, such as Alzheimer’s disease26 and
Huntington’s disease.27
While genetic testing is often heralded as the panacea for medical
uncertainty because it provides patients and clinicians with targeted
information about an individual’s predisposition to disease, it may actually
lead to more uncertainty and complications.28
21. Id. at 286.
22. See Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860, 863
(2001).
23. See Payal D. Shah & Susan M. Domchek, The Contemporary Landscape of Genetic
Testing and Breast Cancer: Emerging Issues, 26 BREAST J. 1549, 1551 (2020).
24. See THE AM. SOC’Y OF BREAST SURGEONS, CONSENSUS GUIDELINE ON GENETIC
TESTING FOR HEREDITARY BREAST CANCER 2 (2019), https://www.breastsurgeons.org/
docs/statements/Consensus-Guideline-on-Genetic-Testing-for-Hereditary-Breast-Cancer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VV67-LZE5].
25. And the list continues to grow.
26. For example, an individual may receive genetic testing results that indicate an
increased risk of developing late-onset Alzheimer’s disease due to the presence of an APOE
mutation. See APOE Gene, MEDLINEP LUS, https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/gene/apoe/
#conditions [https://perma.cc/8CRR-QNHH] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
27. The mutation that causes Huntington’s disease increases the size of a segment in the
HTT gene. See HTT Gene, MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/gene/
htt/#conditions [https://perma.cc/88GC-KT4T] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
28. See Sharon C. Zehe, Genetic Testing: Legal and Ethical Issues and Duties for
Providers, 7 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 94, 94 (2014) (“Genetic testing now provides patients
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B. How Are Variants Classified?
Despite the increasing popularity of genetic testing, “genetic variant
classification science is in its infancy.”29 There is a dearth of oversight of
genetic testing laboratories and companies with regard to variant
classification.30 Further, credible variant classification has been impeded by
certain companies’ virtual monopoly on genetic data and the failure of
clinical laboratories and researchers to share data.31 Against this backdrop,
in order to standardize evidence requirements and make classification
algorithms more discerning, the American College of Medical Genetics and
Genomics (ACMG) and the Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP)
have issued guidance for genetic testing laboratories on the classification of
sequence variants.32 The ACMG guidelines, first issued in 200033 and
revised in 200734 and 2015,35 classify variants in one of five tiers from lowest
to highest pathogenicity: benign, likely benign, variant of uncertain
significance, likely pathogenic, and pathogenic.36 According to the
guidelines, “initial classifications should be based on all available
information regarding variant pathogenicity, including population frequency,
functional data, segregation analysis, and phenotype analysis.”37
The 2015 guidelines surveyed the germline clinical-genetics community
and determined that 90 percent certainty in either direction was sufficient to
describe a variant as either likely pathogenic or likely benign.38 In the
clinical setting, pathogenic or likely pathogenic results “are considered
positive results that may alter care.”39 Thus, based on pathogenic or likely

who historically faced complicated information about their current health with even more
complicated information about future and potential risks for themselves, their children, and
family members.”).
29. Giles et al., supra note 20, at 286, 287 (“Variants are discovered by comparing
sequenced DNA to a reference sequence, where any deviation from the reference sequence is
considered a variant.”).
30. See infra Part III.C (discussing deficiencies in the regulation of genetic testing
companies, particularly with regard to variant classification).
31. See infra Part III.D.
32. See Richards et al., supra note 13, at 406; Giles et al., supra note 20, at 288.
33. See generally ACMG Recommendations for Standards for Interpretation of Sequence
Variations, 2 GENETICS MED. 302 (2000).
34. See generally C. Sue Richards, Sherri Bale, Daniel B. Bellissimo, Soma Das, Wayne
W. Grody, Madhuri R. Hegde, Elaine Lyon & Brian E. Ward, ACMG Recommendations for
Standards for Interpretation and Reporting of Sequence Variations: Revisions 2007,
10 GENETICS MED. 294 (2008).
35. See generally Richards et al., supra note 13.
36. Id. at 407.
37. Jacqueline Mersch, Nichole Brown, Sara Pirzadeh-Miller, Erin Mundt, Hannah
C. Cox, Krystal Brown, Melissa Aston, Lisa Esterling, Susan Manley & Theodora Ross,
Prevalence of Variant Reclassification Following Hereditary Cancer Genetic Testing,
320 JAMA 1266, 1267 (2018).
38. See Giles et al., supra note 20, at 288.
39. Id.; see also Richards et al., supra note 13, at 423 (explaining that no variant category
implies 100 percent certainty, and that “a variant classified as ‘likely pathogenic’ has sufficient
evidence that a healthcare provider can use the molecular testing information in clinical
decision making when combined with other evidence of the disease in question”).
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pathogenic test results, patients may be advised to undergo surgical
interventions, take medications, or take other precautions to prevent illness.
1. Variants of Unknown Significance
Individuals who seek genetic testing often receive results indicating that
certain mutations are variants of unknown significance.40 Unlike known
pathogenic or benign mutations, VUS are genetic test results for which the
clinical significance is not yet determined, meaning that the mutation may or
may not increase the risk of disease. In other words, a VUS is a genetic
variant that has an unknown effect on protein function and phenotype.41
According to the ACMG guidelines, variants unable to be classified as
pathogenic, likely pathogenic, benign, or likely benign remain VUS until
enough evidence is collected or evidentiary conflicts are resolved.42
The concept and meaning of VUS are confusing to physicians and patients
alike. In fact, a working group of the ACMG recommended against reporting
VUS to patients, recognizing “the challenge of attempting to report and
interpret variants of unknown significance as incidental findings.”43
Knowledge of a VUS can exacerbate uncertainty in medical decision-making
and, in some cases, lead to misguided and contraindicated medical
interventions. In fact, because commercial laboratories and companies make
their own classifications based on data available to them, the companies
themselves sometimes disagree on how to classify a particular variant. And
in some cases—like that of the Mathes family—these classifications can be
based on evidence from a single study.44 As Lily Hoffman-Andrews
describes it, “[t]he current approach to VUS can sometimes seem like the
passing of a hot potato from the lab to the clinician on to the patient, who is
ultimately the one who has to live with the uncertainty of the result—and
who is generally least equipped to understand it.”45
2. Reclassification of Genetic Variants
Variant classification is not set in stone. Over time, as more individuals
are tested for a particular variant, genetic testing companies may reclassify
the test result.46 Reclassification can mean upgrading from benign to VUS,
or from VUS to pathogenic. Or it can mean downgrading the variant from
VUS to benign, or—like in the case of the Mathes family—pathogenic to
VUS. In the absence of specific regulations related to the classification of
40. See Moriah Wright, Vijay Menon, Lindsay Taylor, Maniamparampil Shashidharan,
Twilla Westercamp & Charles Ternent, Factors Predicting Reclassification of Variants of
Unknown Significance, 216 AM. J. SURGERY 1148, 1148 (2018).
41. See id.
42. See Richards et al., supra note 13, at 411.
43. Green et al, supra note 5, at 567.
44. See Marcus, supra note 1.
45. Hoffman-Andrews, supra note 11, at 656.
46. See Mersch et al., supra note 37, at 1267 (“[G]enetic test results are based on the best
scientific information at a given moment, which may change as scientific knowledge
evolves.”).
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genetic variants, the 2015 ACMG guidelines “encourage” genetic testing
laboratories “to consider proactive amendment of cases when a variant
reported with a near definitive classification (pathogenic or benign) must be
reclassified.”47
Reclassification is rather common. In one study in which 1,816 variants
were analyzed, 17.3 percent were reclassified at least once.48
Reclassification is more common for certain diseases than others. For
example, “[g]enetic testing in clinical areas other than cancer may have a
greater likelihood of generating both variants of unknown significance and
erroneous determinations of pathogenicity.”49 And reclassification can take
years; one study found that the median time for reclassification is over three
and a half years50—ample time for individuals to weigh their options and
take prophylactic action to avoid potential illness.
Currently, clinical laboratories do not regularly reinterpret data. Rather,
physicians usually only request this after an intervening event, such as the
onset of new symptoms.51 Further, while “iterative reclassification policies
are considered best practices by experts in this type of analysis,” they are not
standard practice for most genetic testing labs.52 Notably, variant
reclassification depends greatly on the testing laboratory.53 While “some
commercial genetic testing laboratories employ an active variant
reclassification process,” notifying the providers that originally ordered the
genetic tests for their patients of updates, “[o]ther laboratories use passive
reclassification processes, in which the providers must supply new
information to help determine whether a specific variant is benign or
pathogenic.”54
While most reclassification involves downgrading a VUS to benign,55 in
some instances, a variant that was initially classified as pathogenic might be
downgraded to a VUS. Working with Myriad Genetics data over a ten-year
period, researchers found that reclassification from pathogenic to unknown

47. Richards et al., supra note 13, at 420.
48. See Thomas P. Slavin, Sophia Manjarrez, Colin C. Pritchard, Stacy Gray & Jeffrey
N. Weitzel, The Effects of Genomic Germline Variant Reclassification on Clinical Cancer
Care, 10 ONCOTARGET 417, 419 (2019).
49. Wylie Burke, Making Sense of the Genome Remains a Work in Progress, 320 JAMA
1247, 1247 (2018).
50. See Slavin et al., supra note 48, at 419 (“Variant reclassification occurred between 63
days and 20.2 years after initial classification, with a median of 3.55 years.”).
51. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Paul S. Appelbaum, Wendy K. Chung, Gary E. Marchant,
Jessica L. Roberts & Barbara J. Evans, Does the Law Require Reinterpretation and Return of
Revised Genomic Results?, 23 GENETICS MED. 833, 834 (2021).
52. See Turna Ray, Genetic Testing Challenges in Oncology: BRCA1 Variant
Downgraded After Risk-Reducing Surgery, PRECISION ONCOLOGY NEWS (Sept. 29, 2021),
https://www.precisiononcologynews.com/cancer/genetic-testing-challenges-oncology-brca1variant-downgraded-after-risk-reducing-surgery [https://perma.cc/XGA3-KFXW].
53. See Slavin et al., supra note 48, at 421.
54. Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
55. See id.
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significance occurred in less than 1 percent of pathogenic variants.56 In
another study analyzing reclassification of variants associated with dilated
cardiomyopathy (DCM), five of 106 variants of unknown significance were
reclassified as likely pathogenic.57 The authors concluded that “[e]xisting
inaccurate variant-disease associations pose a challenge for clinical variant
interpretation and indicate a critical need for an iterative, systematic
reassessment of previously classified genetic variation.”58
Based on findings such as these, even before the Mathes family’s story
came to light, there were already cases reported of pathogenic variants that
had been downgraded to VUS, likely benign, or benign.59 Cases, like those
of Nancy Seegar and the unnamed woman and her mother discussed in Part
II.B.1 below, demonstrate that the Mathes family’s plight is not unique and
that the harms are real. And while variant reclassification from pathogenic
to VUS may be rare, the effects of taking avoidable prophylactic action can
be devastating.60 We, as a society, have determined that low incidences of
certain adverse events related to decision-making that, on the whole, benefit
the community, should still be compensable.61 Further, throughout
medicine, patients make decisions, with the support of their physicians, in
the wake of uncertainty that turn out to be unnecessary.
In response to the case of the Mathes family, Susan Manley, senior vice
president of medical services at Myriad, explained: “We know these are very
difficult situations. We make these reclassifications very carefully. The
science is evolving.”62 She noted that changing a classification from harmful
to uncertain “is a rare event, but I understand that rare is of no consolation to
the patient when it happens to them.”63

56. Mersch et al., supra note 37, at 1270 (finding that, out of 44,777 unique variants of
hereditary cancer genes, 6.4 percent (2,861) were reclassified into new clinical categories).
57. See Trevor J. Pugh, Melissa A. Kelly, Sivakumar Gowrisankar, Elizabeth Hynes,
Michael A. Seidman, Samantha M. Baxter, Mark Bowser, Bryan Harrison, Daniel Aaron, Lisa
M. Mahanta, Neal K. Lakdawala, Gregory McDermott, Emily T. White, Heidi L. Rehm,
Matthew Lebo & Birgit H. Funke, The Landscape of Genetic Variation in Dilated
Cardiomyopathy as Surveyed by Clinical DNA Sequencing, 16 GENETICS MED. 601, 602–03
(2014).
58. Id. at 601.
59. See generally Yvonne Bombard, Kyle B. Brothers, Sara Fitzgerald-Butt, Nanibaa’
A. Garrison, Leila Jamal, Cynthia A. James, Gail P. Jarvik, Jennifer B. McCormick, Tanya
N. Nelson, Kelly E. Ormond, Heidi L. Rehm, Julie Richer, Emmanuelle Souzeau, Jason
L. Vassy, Jennifer K. Wagner & Howard P. Levy, The Responsibility to Recontact Research
Participants After Reinterpretation of Genetic and Genomic Research Results, 104 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 578 (2019) (noting that recontacting patients is most compelling in such
cases); Yong, supra note 16.
60. See infra Part II.A.
61. See infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
62. ‘I Would Have Had Another Kid’: How an Imperfect Gene Test Led to Major Surgery
and Big Regrets, ADVISORY BD. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.advisory.com/dailybriefing/2020/01/07/brca-test [https://perma.cc/9BQ9-YCAJ].
63. Id.
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II. DIAGNOSING THE “HARM WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE” PROBLEM
In some cases, genetic testing—and specifically, variant reclassification—
can, in fact, give rise to negligence and medical malpractice claims.64
Medical malpractice law is a part of tort law, and thus a claim alleging
medical malpractice must prove the classic four elements of a tort claim:
(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to use reasonable care to prevent
harm to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty by failing to adhere to the
standard of care, (3) harm or injury to the plaintiff, and (4) a causal link
between the injury and the breach of duty.65 Professors David M. Studdert,
Michelle M. Mello, and Troyen Brennan have explained that the goals of
malpractice litigation are “to deter unsafe practices, to compensate persons
injured through negligence, and to exact corrective justice.”66
In theory, the harms experienced by the Mathes family seem to be exactly
the types of harms that medical malpractice claims are intended to address.
And it might seem that Myriad, the surgeons, or others who participated in
the Mathes family’s decisions to undergo surgical interventions because of
the formerly pathogenic test results should be liable. However, this part will
demonstrate that, although there is no clear negligence in the reclassification
of genetic information based on sound scientific information, there is a
demonstrable harm.

64. See, e.g., Foulkes et al., supra note 12, at 155 (noting that as labs work to reclassify
and understand variants, “which may—or may not—gain clinical significance as science
reveals more about genetic risk, the potential for legal liability raises the stakes of accurate
variant interpretation in an environment of uncertainty”); Jennifer K. Wagner & Michelle M.
Meyer, Genomic Medicine and the “Loss of Chance” Medical Malpractice Doctrine, 2 HUM.
GENETICS & GENOMICS ADVANCES, no. 3, 2021, at 1, 1 (“Genomic medicine malpractice
caselaw is only beginning to emerge, with approximately 200 reported cases over four decades
that involve alleged failures to diagnose a genetic disorder, interpret genetic test results
appropriately, offer genetic screening when indicated, return results to patients, or treat a
genetic condition properly.”). Professors Wagner and Meyer warn that when a test result is
overturned by new data, but not told to the patient, there are
concerns about when and how individuals might ultimately learn this information
and whether the discovery will be too late for those individuals to avoid (1) the
progression of a condition for which prevention or treatment was available, or
(2) unnecessary harms, such as ineffective treatments for which substitutes were
available.
Id.; see also Pilar N. Ossorio, Product Liability for Predictive Genetic Tests, 41 JURIMETRICS
J. 239, 243 (2001) (“Companies that manufacture or sell genetic tests are subject to liability
for negligence . . . . If a company fails to use due care in manufacturing, conducting a test, or
reporting test results, and this failure causes harm to a test user, then the company may be
liable.”).
65. See JESSICA W. BERG, CHARLES W. LIDZ, LISA S. PARKER & PAUL S. APPELBAUM,
INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 133 (2d ed. 2001); David M.
Studdert, Michelle M. Mello & Troyen Brennan, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED.
283, 283 (2004) (“The standard traditionally used to evaluate whether the breach in question
rises to the level of negligence is medical custom—the quality of care that would be expected
of a reasonable practitioner in similar circumstances.”).
66. Studdert et al, supra note 65, at 283.
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A. Harm
1. Physical Harms
In response to their original genetic test results, the members of the Mathes
family underwent aggressive surgeries, had painful and prolonged
recoveries, and experienced long-term health sequelae.67 They each made
irreversible, life-altering medical decisions in reliance on their original
genetic test results, decisions they likely would not have made had they
learned of their lower risk sooner. Some had oophorectomies, triggering
early menopause and eliminating their opportunity to have more biological
children.68 Some had prophylactic mastectomies, an invasive and complex
surgery that causes patients substantial pain with an extended recovery
period.69 Katy Mathes, who underwent a double mastectomy, recalled: “It
was nine months before I was cleared to pick up my child . . . . I wasn’t able
to do bathtime with him. I wasn’t able to make dinner for him.”70
According to science journalist Ed Yong, “[m]any geneticists have similar
tales where mistakes in the scientific literature have led to wrong—and
sometimes harmful—diagnoses.”71 In October 2021, The Pew Charitable
Trusts identified “real risks” associated with genetic tests, explaining that
“[a]ccording to FDA, inaccurate tests could cause patients to undergo
unnecessary, costly, and risky treatment when tests return false-positive
results.”72
When a patient receives notification of a pathogenic variant, they often
take prophylactic measures to reduce their risk. For example, in the case of
BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations, bilateral prophylactic mastectomy is
considered to be the single most effective prevention method to reduce breast
cancer risk, as it lowers the chances of developing breast cancer by at least

67. See Marcus, supra note 1.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. After Cancer-Prevention Surgeries, Women Learn BRCA Gene Test May Have
Been Wrong, CBS NEWS (Dec. 24, 2019, 7:54 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/brcamutation-after-cancer-preventative-surgeries-women-learn-genetic-test-may-have-beenwrong/ [https://perma.cc/6XJM-8U8N].
71. Yong, supra note 16. For example, in a study of over 60,000 people, a team from
Massachusetts General Hospital analyzed 200 gene variants that were classified as pathogenic
in two widely used databases and found enough evidence to classify only nine of them as
pathogenic. Id. Yong also reported another study by Dr. Stephen Kingsmore at the National
Center for Genome Resources in Santa Fe, Arizona, which found that a quarter of mutations
linked to childhood genetic diseases were debatable because the claims “were based on papers
that contained extremely weak evidence” or “were plain wrong.” Id.
72. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., DIAGNOSTIC TESTS NOT REVIEWED BY FDA PRESENT
GROWING RISKS TO PATIENTS (2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2021/10/
diagnostictestsnotreviewedbyfdapresentgrowingriskstopatients.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6GRMGS4].
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90 percent73 and reduces breast cancer–specific mortality.74 BRCA-positive
individuals may seek to reduce their risk of developing ovarian cancer by
undergoing bilateral prophylactic salpingo-oophorectomy (the surgical
removal of the fallopian tubes and ovaries) or regular screening, including
regular ultrasounds and CA-125 blood tests.75
While each of these strategies offers significant risk reduction, they also
carry with them significant health implications and side effects, many of
which can be lifelong. For example, bilateral prophylactic oophorectomy
induces early menopause, increased risk of cardiovascular disease,
osteoporosis, and cognitive impairment.76
Variant reclassification can lead to revised clinical recommendations for
patients and their families.77 One study found that 12 percent of
reclassifications resulted in a change in the major reporting category, “with
a potential to impact patient management.”78 Another observed that the
“downgrade of variants may have also led to substantial changes in
management.”79 Earlier recommendations to undergo prophylactic surgery,
“in retrospect, may be clinically inappropriate.”80 For example, according to
the report in Precision Oncology News discussed in Part II.A, “[t]he
mother . . . was understandably shaken to learn that the test result that led her
to have risk-reducing surgeries, a decision that carries significant health,
reproductive, and quality-of-life consequences, was no longer valid.”81
Further, variant classification and reclassification can influence
reproductive decision-making. Based on the results of genetic tests,
individuals may make important and irreversible medical choices. Ms.
Mathes herself grieved over the fact that had she not undergone an

73. See Therese B. Bevers, John H. Ward, Banu K. Arun, Graham A. Colditz, Kenneth
H. Cowan, Mary B. Daly, Judy E. Garber, Mary L. Gemignani, William J. Gradishar, Judith
A. Jordan, Larissa A. Korde, Nicole Kounalakis, Helen Krontiras, Shicha Kumar, Allison
Kurian, Christine Laronga, Rachel M. Layman & Loretta S. Loftus, Breast Cancer Risk
Reduction, Version 2.2015, 13 NAT’L COMPREHENSIVE CANCER NETWORK 880, 893 (2015).
74. See N.E. Carbine, L. Lostumbo, J. Wallace & H. Ko, Risk-Reducing Mastectomy for
the Prevention of Primary Breast Cancer (Review), COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS.,
Apr. 2018, at 1, 27 (gathering studies and concluding that bilateral mastectomy was effective
in reducing death from breast cancer). Other prophylactic options include the use of selective
estrogen receptor modulators, such as tamoxifen and raloxifene, as chemoprevention agents.
See Tasleem J. Padamsee, Celia E. Wills, Lisa D. Lee & Electra D. Paskett, Decision Making
for Breast Cancer Prevention Among Women at Elevated Risk, 19 BREAST CANCER RSCH., no.
34, 2017, at 1, 2. Individuals may also seek to minimize breast cancer risk through increased
surveillance (including frequent mammograms and/or MRIs) or “watchful waiting.” Id. at 3.
75. See Marleah Dean & Carla L. Fisher, Uncertainty and Previvors’ Cancer Risk
Management: Understanding the Decision-Making Process, 47 J. APPLIED COMMC’N RSCH.
460, 462 (2019).
76. See Padamsee et al., supra note 74, at 2.
77. See Scott A. Turner, Smita K. Rao, R. Hayes Morgan, Cindy L. Vnencak-Jones &
Georgia L. Wiesner, The Impact of Variant Classification on the Clinical Management of
Hereditary Cancer Syndromes, 21 GENETICS MED. 426, 429 (2019).
78. Id.
79. Slavin et al., supra note 48, at 421.
80. Id.
81. Ray, supra note 52.
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unnecessary oophorectomy, she could have had more children.82 Members
of the Mathes family were not the only individuals to undergo invasive
medical interventions based on (at the time) actionable genetic test results,
only to learn that those actions were unnecessary. In 2015, it was reported
that a pathogenic result for a prenatal genetic test for Noonan syndrome, a
genetic disorder that prevents normal development throughout the body, led
a couple to terminate their pregnancy.83 Subsequent research showed:
“[T]he mutation is so common in certain ethnic groups that it couldn’t
possibly be responsible for a rare disease like Noonan syndrome. It wasn’t
pathogenic after all.”84
Another study of variant reclassification noted that “[s]ome individuals
may choose not to conceive children based solely on knowing there is a
cancer-causing mutation in the family.”85 Thus, “[i]f variants are initially
misclassified, prospective parents may either unnecessarily opt for, or fail to
engage in, medically appropriate and preference sensitive reproductive
decision making.”86
However, by the time patients learn that their mutations have been
downgraded, it is often too late. In many cases in which a patient receives a
report indicating the existence of a pathogenic mutation, time is of the
essence. In such cases, people do act—often quickly—on the results they
receive from genetic testing companies. One study observed: “Many . . .
genetic test results are accompanied by significant medical management
recommendations as well. . . . [I]n some of these cases, significant medical
management decisions may have already been made.”87 The study found
that “[m]any prophylactic surgeries take place within 2 years after someone
has been diagnosed with a hereditary cancer syndrome, and the majority of
women with pathogenic BRCA1/2 variants elect for a risk-reducing bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomy.”88
2. Emotional Harms and Uncertainty
Changes in variant classification can lead to significant uncertainty and
mental anguish.89 Genetic testing is rife with uncertainty, and “what sounds
82. See Marcus, supra note 1.
83. Yong, supra note 16. The genetic test revealed a mutation in PTPN11, a gene that
affects the risk of Noonan syndrome. See id.
84. Id. Upon learning of the downgrading of the mutation, Heidi Rehm, the original
scientist, “immediately contacted the physician to find out the story with that baby,” at which
point she “found out that the parents had terminated it.” Id.
85. Slavin et al., supra note 48, at 421.
86. Id.
87. Sarah Macklin, Nisha Durand, Paldeep Atwal & Stephanie Hines, Observed
Frequency and Challenges of Variant Reclassification in a Hereditary Cancer Clinic, 20
GENETICS MED. 346, 349 (2018).
88. Id.
89. Gina Kolata, When Gene Tests for Breast Cancer Reveal Grim Data But No Guidance,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/health/breast-cancer-brcagenetic-testing.html [https://perma.cc/LTH9-4BZE] (“[P]atients need to be prepared for
ambiguities.”).
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like a simple test can leave patients with frightening information but no clear
options or guidance for treatment decisions.”90 In the context of BRCA
mutations, some patients have described receiving pathogenic test results as
“feeling like a ticking time bomb.”91
When a variant is reclassified from pathogenic to VUS or benign,
uncertainty and confusion are exacerbated, particularly when individuals
have already made medical decisions based on the earlier results. If a person
decides to take prophylactic action based on a genetic test result, only to later
learn that the variant had been downgraded, the devastation they may
experience cannot be understated. There is something particularly profound
about receiving a report that classifies a mutation as pathogenic and later
being told that a mutation is a VUS. One study reported that individuals who
had undergone genetic testing for arrhythmogenic right ventricular
cardiomyopathy, a progressive, inherited heart muscle disease, displayed
specific psychological injuries when variants that were previously classified
as pathogenic or likely pathogenic were later downgraded.92 The authors
observed that “the loss of genetic pathogenicity has important clinical
consequences: the misinterpretation of the variant may have introduced
unnecessary costs and may have impacted their psychological wellbeing.”93
Even if the patient does not take prophylactic medical action upon receiving
the erroneous pathogenic report, such results can still have enormous—and
unnecessary—psychological ramifications.94
90. Id.
91. Marni Vyn, Taking After My Dad, SHARSHERET (June 17, 2021),
https://sharsheret.org/taking-after-my-dad/ [https://perma.cc/AJR7-9TTJ]. Even when a
mutation is correctly identified as pathogenic, uncertainty about the best treatment approach
can still exist. The story of Angie Watts is one such case: Ms. Watts was a woman with breast
cancer who tested positive for a mutation in a gene required to repair DNA. Kolata, supra note
89. One physician cautioned that she should avoid radiation therapy because he worried that
the treatment would exacerbate the growth of cancer cells. Id. Another physician provided
contradictory guidance, advising that the mutation was not harmful and that she should, in
fact, undergo radiation therapy. Id. In the absence of medical consensus, the experts “left it
up to [her] to decide,” and the experience greatly perturbed Ms. Watts. Id. (“It was scary.
There are times I regret ever having genetic testing.”). Moreover, many patients live with
stigma associated with the impact of decisions they make. In one study, a woman who had
recently found out she was BRCA positive expressed concern “whether her mutation status
and impending surgeries would constrain her potential for finding a life partner and bearing
children.” Lindsey M. Hoskins & Allison Werner-Lin, A Multi-Case Report of the Pathways
to and Through Genetic Testing and Cancer Risk Management for BRCA Mutation-Positive
Women Aged 18–25, 22 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 27, 31 (2013). And importantly, “people’s
preferences are not stable and well-defined,” and are prone to instability. Wendy Netter
Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2017).
92. See Sarah Costa, Argelia Medeiros-Domingo, Alessio Gasperetti, Deniz Akdis,
Wolfgang Berger, Cynthia A. James, Frank Ruschitzka, Corinna B. Brunckhorst, Firat Duru
& Ardan M. Saguner, Impact of Genetic Variant Reassessment on the Diagnosis of
Arrythmogenic Right Ventricular Cardiomyopathy Based on the 2010 Task Force Criteria,
14 GENOMICS & PRECISION MED. 49, 55 (2021).
93. Id. (concluding that “with 10.1% of patients losing their definite disease status,
accurate determination of variant pathogenicity is of utmost importance in the diagnosis of
[arrythmogenic right ventricular cardiomyopathy]”).
94. See Danielle Gould, Rachel Walker, Grace Makari-Judson & Memnun Seven,
Experiences of Individuals with a Variant of Uncertain Significance on Genetic Testing for
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Further, the harms that can occur due to the downgrading of a previously
classified pathogenic variant can extend to family members. As the authors
of one study on the reclassification of genetic variants stated:
[E]ven when considering just the first degree relatives, the potential impact
of the changes in actionability of the reclassified variants is impressive.
The reclassifications we followed may have affected the genetic cancer risk
assessment/counseling for 150 adult male and female first-degree relatives
of the 25 carriers. If half of these individuals are assumed to carry the
reclassified variant due to the autosomal dominant transmission of the
genes . . . 75 individuals would be at risk of overtreatment or missed
opportunities for cancer screening or risk reducing procedures. 95

While the downgrading of genetic tests from pathogenic to VUS or benign
may be relatively rare, it is not wholly uncommon. And when it does occur,
the ramifications can be great. Importantly, the questions of whether and
how we compensate individuals who have suffered harm in medicine in the
absence of identifiable negligence is much more universal. People make
decisions all the time based on current scientific and medical information but
can end up harmed as a result. Under current legal norms, when that
information is unclear, or later discovered to be wrong, they may suffer
incompensable harms—both physical and psychosocial.
B. Negligence
Conventional medical malpractice fails to address these harms. From all
accounts, genetic testing companies like Myriad base their classification
determinations on up-to-date criteria and evolving evidence.96 The Mathes
family’s doctors presumably performed the surgeries and provided care
based on current evidence and pursuant to the standard of care.97 In this case,
no mistake was made. Instead, new information led Myriad to update its
variant classification.98
In short, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that a duty
to these individuals had been breached by either the genetic testing company
or the treating physician, or that the individuals’ injuries were caused by the
company’s or doctors’ negligent actions.99 In many cases involving the
downgrading of pathogenic variants, there is no clear negligence on the part
of the genetic testing company or health-care provider. This section will

Hereditary Cancer Risks: A Mixed Method Systematic Review, 13 J. CMTY. GENETICS 371,
376 (2022) (finding a general lack of understanding among individuals with a VUS result and
noting that anxiety and distress are linked to forgetting medical information or to the
misconception that the information is unimportant).
95. Slavin et al., supra note 48, at 421.
96. See Marcus, supra note 1.
97. See Roberts & Foulkes, supra note 9, at 162–74 (identifying how the elements of duty
and breach may not be met in cases of genetic variant reclassification).
98. See Marcus, supra note 1.
99. See BERG ET AL., supra note 65, at 133–34; Valerie Gutmann Koch, Eliminating
Liability for Lack of Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1211, 1218
(2019); Wagner & Meyer, supra note 64, at 2.
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explore the absence of negligence claims in these cases, first against the
genetic testing companies and then against the treating physicians.
1. Against Genetic Testing Companies
There are a variety of reasons why recovery against genetic testing
companies for injuries arising from variant reclassification is unlikely. First,
and most importantly, patients may find it difficult, if not impossible, to
prove breach. Second, even if genetic testing companies have breached a
duty to the patient, the plaintiff must still prove that their injuries were caused
by the company’s negligent actions. Finally, a plaintiff may have particular
difficulty overcoming arguments that they assumed the risk.
When clinical laboratories reclassify a mutation, they may not have a legal
duty to individuals to whom they render services.100 While it may be argued
that negligence should lie when a laboratory fails to reinterpret and return
revised genomic results, “there are no cases, statutes, or regulations at present
that support a legal duty to reinterpret clinical genomic tests and return any
new analyses.”101 Thus, some scholars have argued in favor of establishing
an ethical102—or even a legal103—duty on genetic testing companies,
particularly when the new results could affect treatment. However, at
present, scholars have generally acknowledged that there is no recognized
legal duty to reinterpret, recontact, or “take any action when a VUS gains
clinical significance.”104
Individuals in circumstances like those of the Mathes family members may
argue that there has, in fact, been a mistake for which the genetic testing
company can be held liable. Perhaps individuals who receive pathogenic
results that are later reclassified as uncertain or benign can make successful
negligence claims against the genetic testing companies that administered or
developed the tests (e.g., for failure to update their reports to reflect scientific
discoveries in a timely manner).105 They may claim that the company was
too hasty in its initial classification, jumping to classify the variant before
accumulating enough research and data. In Ms. Mathes’s case, the analysis
of the BRCA variant present in her and her family may have relied too
heavily on the findings of a single study from 2011.106 However, despite the
fact that the study was conducted in 2011, one of the authors explained that
100. See generally Foulkes et al., supra note 12.
101. Clayton et al., supra note 51, at 833.
102. See generally Karen L. David, Robert G. Best, Leslie Manace Brenman, Lynn Bush,
Joshua L. Deignan, David Flannery, Jodi D. Hoffman, Ingrid Holm, David T. Miller, James
O’Leary & Reed E. Pyeritz, Patient Re-Contact After Revision of Genomic Test Results:
Points to Consider—A Statement of the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics
(ACMG), 21 GENETICS MED. 769 (2019).
103. See generally Roberts & Foulkes, supra note 9.
104. Id. at 148; see also Foulkes et al., supra note 12; David et al., supra note 102; Gary
Marchant, Mark Barnes, James P. Evans, Bonnie LeRoy & Susan M. Wolf, From Genetics to
Genomics: Facing the Liability Implications in Clinical Care, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 11
(2020).
105. See Clayton et al., supra note 51.
106. See Marcus, supra note 1.
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it still met the current ACMG standard for deeming a variant deleterious.107
Thus, Myriad presumably followed the standard of care and relied on the
most up-to-date research at the time it reported the pathogenic variant back
to the Mathes family.108
In another example, an unnamed patient underwent genetic testing for
mutations in the BRCA1 gene based on the fact that her mother had had a
bilateral mastectomy and risk-reducing salpingo-oophorectomy at a young
age after genetic testing.109 Subsequently, the patient’s and her mother’s
mutations were downgraded to VUS.110
Upon learning of the
reclassification, the patient’s mother was “angry” because she had “gone into
debt to have risk-reducing surgeries based on her genetic test result.”111 This
story clearly illustrates that the current standard of care in genetic testing and
disclosure practices can nevertheless cause serious injury to patients.112
The fact that the initial classification was based on up-to-date scientific
evidence distinguishes the Mathes family’s experience from that of Nancy
Seeger, who sued a genetic testing company in 2000.113 Ms. Seeger had
submitted a specimen for genetic testing to the company, who informed her
that she had a pathogenic BRCA1 mutation.114 Based on this report, she
elected to undergo a prophylactic oophorectomy.115 Eight months later,
while she was considering undergoing a double mastectomy to further reduce
her risk of breast cancer, the company downgraded her mutation, informing
her that she did not, in fact, have the disease-conferring mutation.116 She
sued the company for medical malpractice, alleging that the company failed
to use reasonable care in maintaining and identifying samples, conducting
the test, or reporting the results.117 The company conceded that it had erred
in its original interpretation of the data.118
In Nancy Seeger’s case, unlike in the Mathes family’s case, the genetic
testing company acknowledged that it had misreported the test result. In

107. Id.
108. Further, it should be noted that voluntary guidelines, like those issued by the ACMG,
may be adopted by courts as the standard of care. But it is likely that companies like Myriad
are following the ACMG guidelines anyway, thereby strengthening the argument that they are
following the appropriate standard of care.
109. See Ray, supra note 52.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See Anne Underwood, When “Knowledge” Does Damage, NEWSWEEK
(Apr. 9, 2000, 8:00 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/when-knowledge-does-damage157593 [https://perma.cc/RB46-XFTR].
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Ossorio, supra note 64, at 244.
118. See id.
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Seeger’s case, the company had sent her “an erroneous result,”119 thereby
failing to use reasonable care in the testing process.
Even when a genetic company misinterprets or misreports genetic test
results, many patients may still be unable to prevail in a malpractice claim
against them. In Belser v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.,120 the genetic testing
company classified a child’s mutation as a VUS, despite existing medical
literature suggesting that the mutation was, in fact, a disease-associated
mutation.121 Due to this misclassification, the child did not receive the
necessary treatment for his illness, resulting in his death in 2008.122 The
child’s mother argued that Quest was negligent in its interpretation of the
SCN1A variant, which led to erroneous treatments that resulted in the child’s
death.123 In 2018, the South Carolina Supreme Court, on certification from
the Belser court, held in Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.124 that diagnostic
laboratories are categorized under state law as health-care providers, like
hospitals, when a treating physician orders a diagnostic test.125 However,
having left room for the plaintiff, Williams, to also argue ordinary
negligence, in November 2020, the Belser court then granted summary
judgment in favor of Quest, holding that there was insufficient evidence that
the variant was erroneously classified, and therefore the plaintiffs were
unable to prove that the VUS classification was due to the genetic testing
company’s negligence.126
As the test case for variant misclassification, Williams signals courts’
reluctance to hold genetic testing companies responsible for imperfect
testing. In the absence of clear evidence of classification error, a plaintiff is
highly unlikely to prevail on a negligence or medical malpractice claim
against a genetic testing company, regardless of the harm suffered by the
plaintiff.127 Based on this holding, genetic testing companies are unlikely to
be held liable for duties to patients to ensure the quality and currency of
variant data.
And even if genetic testing companies are found to have breached a duty,
the learned intermediary doctrine might cut them off based on physician
119. Rick Weiss, A Defective Side to Genetic Testing, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 1999),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-jul-26-he-59830-story.html
[https://perma.cc/E6QD-YEC9].
120. No. 16-0972, 2020 WL 6526084 (D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2020).
121. See id. at *2.
122. See id. at *3.
123. See id. at *1, *3.
124. 816 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 2018).
125. See id. The court also held that the plaintiff’s lawyers failed to establish “a causal
nexus” between the genetic test report and the child’s treatment. See generally Timothy
Nicolette, Williams v. Quest: The South Carolina Supreme Court’s Misdiagnosis of Quest
Diagnostics as a Health Care Provider and the Poor Prognosis for Plaintiffs in Medical
Malpractice, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 393 (2019) (arguing that the South Carolina Supreme
Court misinterpreted a state statute to classify diagnostic labs as health-care providers and,
therefore, the opinion should be overturned).
126. Belser, 2020 WL 6526084, at *11. The court also held that the medical malpractice
claim was time-barred. Id.
127. See id. at *7.
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negligence. The learned intermediary doctrine stems from the idea that
health-care providers are best positioned to correctly diagnose and treat their
patients’ medical problems.128 This doctrine recognizes that “many factors,
in addition to genetic predisposition, should enter into decisions about which
drugs to prescribe and treatments to pursue.”129 However, as discussed in
Part II.B.2, creating physician liability is unlikely to be the solution.
Even if treating physicians or genetic testing companies have breached a
duty to the patient, plaintiffs must still prove that their injuries were caused
by the company’s or doctors’ negligent actions. To successfully recover, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was both the but-for and
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Thus, a plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s negligence more likely
than not caused her injury. As Professor Pilar Ossorio explained: “In cases
pertaining to predictive genetic tests, causation will be the most difficult
negligence element to prove. Genetic tests themselves generally are not
medically risky; it is the information obtained from them and the decisions
made in reliance on that information that can lead to harm.”130
When suing a genetic testing company, the plaintiff must prove that the
original classification caused them to undergo painful and unnecessary
medical interventions. But Adrian Thorogood and Professors Robert
Cook-Deegan and Bartha Marie Knoppers argued in the context of Williams:
“This proof is hindered by the intervention of a physician . . . which may
break the chain of causation and scientific uncertainty . . . . These
uncertainties over causation are even more pronounced for misclassified data
sharing through a variant database.”131
Finally, there are strong, scientifically based policy arguments against
imposing liability for genetic testing companies’ incorrect classification of
genetic variants. Imposing liability in such cases may disincentivize
companies from updating and returning results after the initial return of
patients’ test results, as this could potentially shield them from liability.
From a policy perspective, we want to encourage laboratories to update their
128. See Victoria M. Kumorowski, Assessing Legal Liability in Pharmacogenetic Cases,
42 WASHBURN L.J. 623, 625 (2003).
129. Id.
130. Ossorio, supra note 64, at 243.
131. Adrian Thorogood, Robert Cook-Deegan & Bartha Marie Knoppers, Public Variant
Databases: Liability?, 19 GENETICS MED. 838, 839 (2017). To the extent that a plaintiff is
able to raise a successful claim against a genetic testing company, it might be alleged that the
patient assumed the risk. See generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Defining the Known Risk:
Context-Sensitivity in Tort Law Defenses, 12 J. TORT L. 9 (2019). In such cases, the (most
often female) individual may be alleged to have acted impetuously, assuming the risk of
(unnecessary) surgical and medical interventions in the face of medical unknowns. However,
such a defense would likely be unsuccessful, even in a jurisdiction that has not abandoned the
assumption-of-risk doctrine. Under the doctrine of secondary assumption of risk, the plaintiff
would have had to have made medical decisions based on knowledge of the defendant’s
negligent actions. However, patients who decide to undergo invasive prophylactic medical
interventions would not have made such decisions if they knew that the test results were
incomplete or that the tests were conducted negligently. The act of genetic testing does not
create risk; rather, it identifies existing risk.
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data in an efficient manner so that patients like those in the Mathes family’s
position have current and correct information with which to make medical
decisions (and, for example, avoid unneeded surgery). In a way, imposing
tort liability would create a counterintuitive, and perhaps perverse, incentive
for laboratories by insulating them from liability if they do not update and
return results, and potentially opening them up to liability if they do.
2. Against Treating Physicians
For physicians, the traditional negligence requirements include an
established physician-patient relationship, which imposes a duty of care on
physicians.132 The physician’s goal in this relationship is to benefit the
patient, either through treatment or preventative care. The doctor-patient
relationship gives rise to a duty of the physician to the patient; breach of that
duty allows the injured patient to recover for damages in civil suit.
Assuming that the physician followed the standard of care in interpreting
the patient’s pathogenic test results and advising the patient about appropriate
prophylactic therapies, physicians will not be held liable for the harm that
occurs due to interventions that are later found to be unnecessary.133 In these
cases, medical malpractice claims or even simple negligence claims are
unavailable. As Professor Gary Marchant has explained: “We don’t hold
doctors to perfection. They can’t prevent all harm. So, the question is, ‘Was
their decision reasonable?’”134
To the extent that genetic testing companies may be liable for the
detrimental decisions that patients make based on their results,135 one may
argue that liability may be obviated by the physician’s guidance and
recommendations to the patient based on the learned intermediary doctrine.
132. See Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed Consent in
Research, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 173, 181–82 (2015).
133. And, in some cases, individuals who receive ambiguous genetic test results may feel
pressured by their physicians—contrary to medical consensus—to undergo prophylactic
surgeries, which may subsequently be deemed “needless.” Christina Bennett, Ambiguous
Genetic Test Results Can Be Unsettling. Worse, They Can Lead to Needless Surgeries., WASH.
POST (Feb. 7, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/genetic-testsuncertain-results/2021/02/05/80a06d9a-65a2-11eb-8468-21bc48f07fe5_story.html
[https://perma.cc/55KQ-KFLF]. In those cases, the plaintiff may be able to prove liability. If
a physician did not follow the standard of care, or there was diagnostic error, then negligence
could lie. See, e.g., Katrina A. Armstrong, Expanding the Vision of Quality and Safety in
Genomic Medicine, 37 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 453 (2021); Barbara J. Evans, The Streetlight
Effect: Regulating Genomics Where the Light Is, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 105, 109 (2020)
(“[T]he fact remains that a person is unlikely to experience such injuries without the
complicity of a clinician who performs unnecessary prophylactic surgery or orders costly tests
not justified by the person’s symptoms and clinical presentation. Unsophisticated laypeople
cannot perform unnecessary surgery on themselves; for bad things to happen, there has to be
a clinician in the loop who proceeds without appropriate clinical indications or confirmatory
testing.”).
134. Turna Ray, Quest Diagnostics Win in Wrongful Death Case Reveals
Ongoing Challenges for Variant Classification, GENOMEWEB (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/quest-diagnostics-win-wrongful-deathcase-reveals-ongoing-challenges-variant [https://perma.cc/YM6B-ZEFH].
135. This is an assumption that was undercut by the discussion in Part II.A.1.
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However, physicians themselves are notoriously lacking in genetic
literacy.136 Scholars continue to call for increased education to improve
genetic fluency, which would provide needed support for patients.137 With
such high rates of genetic illiteracy among physicians, they cannot be
expected to play an active enough role in interpretation to provide a defense
to genetic-test company liability.138 It may still lie with the genetic testing
companies to adequately interpret test results and the data on which variant
classification relies, presuming that physicians who receive the results also
pass this information (and any appropriate warnings) to patients.139
136. See generally Vu T. Dung Ha, Julie Frizzo-Barker & Peter Chow-White, Adopting
Clinical Genomics: A Systematic Review of Genomic Literacy Among Physicians in Cancer
Care, 11 BMC MED. GENOMICS, no. 18, 2018, at 1, 1; Erin W. Dekanek, Darcy L. Thull,
Mylynda Massart, Robin E. Grubs, Aleksander Rajkovic & Phuong L. Mai, Knowledge and
Opinions Regarding BRCA1 and BRCA2 Genetic Testing Among Primary Care Physicians,
29 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 122 (2020); Joan Stephenson, As Discoveries Unfold, a New
Urgency to Bring Genetic Literacy to Physicians, 278 JAMA 1125 (1997).
137. See, e.g., Nonie S. Arora, J. Kelly Davis, Christine Kirby, Amy L. McGuire, Robert
C. Green, J.S. Blumenthal-Barby & Peter A. Ubel, Communication Challenges for
Nongeneticist Physicians Relaying Clinical Genomic Results, 14 PERSONALIZED MED. 423
(2017); Stephanie White, Chris Jacobs & Jane Phillips, Mainstreaming Genetics and
Genomics: A Systematic Review of the Barriers and Facilitators for Nurses and Physicians
in Secondary and Tertiary Care, 22 GENETICS MED. 1149 (2020); RaeLynn Forsyth, Weiyi
Mu, Laura Gibson, Janet R. Serwint, Nicole Shilkofski & Joann Bodurtha, A Structured
Genetics Rotation for Pediatric Residents: An Important Educational Opportunity, 22
GENETICS MED. 793 (2020); Ha et al., supra note 136.
138. See Ossorio, supra note 64, at 256 (“The application of the learned intermediary
justification to genetic tests is unclear. Most practicing physicians have inadequate training
in medical genetics and may face problems determining the appropriateness of a genetic test
for a particular patient.”).
139. See Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories
Norplant Case and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to
Direct-to-Consumer Drug Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 534 (2000). In practice,
physicians have served as the gatekeepers to medical knowledge, making informed decisions
to withhold some information when it is in the best interest of the patient to do so. See Giles
et al., supra note 20, at 290. There is a power asymmetry in the doctor-patient relationship.
See Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of
Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 860 (“One of the primary goals of the informed consent
obligation is to correct an information asymmetry between physician and patient, an
asymmetry that is made even starker by the physician’s position of power.”). In circumstances
like those encountered by the Mathes family, it might be argued that withholding the potential
pathogenic nature of individuals’ genetic variants might constitute an abrogation of their
autonomy. Rather, these patients should have access to all available information related to
their particular situations—even if that information is incomplete or imperfect—and be
empowered to make, with the support of their physicians, the best medical decisions for them.
Based on information asymmetries and vulnerabilities, the tort system, particularly in the
medical negligence context, places certain expectations on physicians and sometimes shifts
risk to practitioners to avoid risk. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (“The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and
ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach
an intelligent decision.”); Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972) (“[T]he patient,
being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and trust in his physician
for the information upon which he relies during the decisional process . . . .”); Betesh v. United
States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974); Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 226 (Ct. App. 1982).
Further, physicians may also be expected to demand more scientific evidence from these
genetic testing companies to support their classification before returning results to their
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Patients could, perhaps, rely on the oft-ignored loss of chance (LOC)
doctrine. The doctrine may be relied on when it is impossible to know
whether the defendant’s medical negligence was the but-for cause of the
plaintiff’s injury—because had the patient known of the “correct” variant
classification, they could have possibly prevented the injury that occurred.140
Although the doctrine has historically been invoked in medical malpractice
cases, “the availability of the LOC medical malpractice doctrine is a
potentially important factor to consider when making programmatic
decisions for genomic medicine.”141 However, it is unlikely that someone in
circumstances similar to that of members of the Mathes family could rely on
the loss of chance doctrine to recover from their physician for their harm.
Professors Jennifer K. Wagner and Michelle M. Meyer have raised the role
of LOC doctrine in proving proximate causation in the context of genetic
malpractice cases.142 Specifically, they observe that “[n]ondisclosed,
erroneous, or delayed genetic testing can, in turn, delay treatment that might
reduce the risk of the underlying genetic condition.”143 Over twenty state
courts have recognized the loss of the chance for a better outcome as a form
of harm.144 In applying the LOC doctrine in medical malpractice cases,
courts have looked to the specific physician-patient relationship, particularly
the expectation that “the physician will take every reasonable measure to
obtain an optimal outcome for the patient.”145
The current medical malpractice jurisprudence therefore indicates that
injured patients face a daunting, and possibly insurmountable, challenge to
prove either that a breach of duty occurred or that their injuries were caused
by a testing company’s or physician’s negligence. Thus, there is no clear
negligence cause of action that arises from the reclassification of genetic
information based on sound scientific information, but there is a
demonstrable harm.

patients. Withholding judgment—or classification—until sufficient evidence has been
accumulated may ultimately benefit patients and their families. However, placing the onus on
physicians to make decisions about which results to withhold or disclose is also an insufficient
remedy.
140. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Pike, Karen H. Rothenberg & Benjamin E. Berkman, Finding
Fault?: Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental Findings in Genomic Research, 102
GEO. L.J. 795, 825 n.161 (2014) (noting that injury “consists of the diminished likelihood of
achieving a more favorable medical outcome” (quoting Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d
819, 832 (Mass. 2008))).
141. Wagner & Meyer, supra note 64, at 1.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2 (describing loss of chance doctrine). The authors also note that “[t]he factual
circumstances in which application of the [loss of chance] doctrine is sought could involve
delayed or erroneous diagnoses as well as delayed or erroneous treatments, and they could
allege physical health, mental health, or non-health harms.” Id.
144. See generally Smith v. Providence Health & Servs., 393 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2017).
145. Pike et al., supra note 140, at 827 (citing Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819,
832 (Mass. 2008)).
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III. POSSIBLE “PRESCRIPTIONS”
In an ideal world, genetic information that is returned to individuals would
be accurate, reliable, and actionable. When it is not, patients may suffer
physical and emotional harms. Thus, the “harm without negligence” problem
implicates the bioethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and
justice.146
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the practice of medicine
appeared to give particular weight to the bioethical principle of beneficence
and its corresponding principle of non-maleficence.147 Non-maleficence is
the foundational value enunciated in the Hippocratic Oath, which requires
the physician to “above all, do no harm” to the patient.148 Applying this
principle to prophylactic decision-making in response to genetic test results,
physicians have an obligation to guide the therapeutic relationship by making
professional recommendations based on sound medical evidence.
The second of these values, respect for persons, is often recognized as the
core principle of genetic counseling.149 It addresses the primary ethical
imperative that individuals should be respected as autonomous agents.150 In
many ways, access to genetic testing and the opportunity to make informed
medical decisions in response to test results is the quintessential case study
on furthering autonomy in medical decision-making.151 Genetic counseling
has historically been driven by the concept of “nondirectiveness,”152 which

146. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (4th ed. 1994). The Belmont Report, published in 1979, enunciated these three ethical
values by which research involving human subjects should be conducted. See NAT’L COMM’N
FOR THE PROT. OF HUM. SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RSCH., THE BELMONT REPORT
(1979),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TKT3-4Q6G] (describing the three principles of respect for persons,
beneficence, and justice).
147. See Akshay Govind, A Short History of the Current Approach to Ethical Health Care,
SYNAPSE (Nov. 7, 2013, 1:52 PM), https://synapse.ucsf.edu/articles/2013/11/07/short-historycurrent-approach-ethical-health-care [https://perma.cc/79T6-Z8WE] (noting that prior to the
1970s, physicians largely aimed to “maximize medical benefits and minimiz[e] risks of harm
and disease”).
148. Cedric M. Smith, Origin and Uses of Primum Non Nocere—Above All, Do No Harm!,
45 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 371, 371 (2005).
149. See Debra J.H. Mathews & Leila Jamal, Revisiting Respect for Persons in Genomic
Research, 5 GENES, no. 1, 2014, at 1, 2.
150. An autonomous individual can consider and act on personal goals, and to respect an
autonomous individual is to accept their opinions and decisions, so long as these actions do
not harm others. The value of respect for persons encourages potential participants to be
involved in the decision-making process, assuring them that they have an essential role in the
research process, and that their opinions and decisions are valued. See Koch, supra note 132,
at 185.
151. See generally Valerie Gutmann Koch, Previvors, 49 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 643 (2022).
152. Leila Jamal, Will Shupmann & Benjamin E. Berkman, An Ethical Framework for
Genetic Counseling in the Genomic Era, 29 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 718, 719 (2020) (“In
genetic counseling specifically, valuing patient autonomy expresses respect for the
emotionally complex and nuanced nature of decisions about reproduction, pregnancy
management, living with a genetic condition, and raising children with special needs.”).
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has been described as a strategy that supports autonomous
decision-making.153
However, the “harm without negligence” problem does not just raise
questions about whether individuals are able to be autonomous
decision-makers; it also raises significant justice concerns. Genetic medicine
already has an inclusion and representation problem because variant
classification is dependent on understanding the background genetic
variation in a population, but “the data that exist largely come from people
of European background.”154 Individuals who belong to racial minority
groups have an especially high likelihood of misclassification or
reclassification because “most genes were sequenced first in White people,
who also tend to have better access to testing.”155 A significant amount of
genetics research has also focused on BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations, which
occur most often in the Ashkenazi Jewish population.156 Combined with
“preference by researchers to analyze data from well-characterized,
well-powered European cohorts,” certain groups and communities have
enjoyed greater resources to invest in the research enterprise.157 Eighty-eight
percent of people included in large-scale studies of human genetic variation
are of European ancestry, as are most participants in clinical trials.158
Thus, misclassification or later reclassification is more likely to occur in
populations for which research has not been conducted.
Variant
classifications contribute to racial disparities in genetic medicine.159 These
health disparities are increasingly being recognized. In August 2016, a study
published in the New England Journal of Medicine advocated for sequencing
the genomes of diverse populations.160 The researchers concluded that
153. See Dianne M. Bartels, Bonnie S. LeRoy, Patricia McCarthy & Arthur L. Caplan,
Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling: A Survey of Practitioners, 72 AM. J. MED. GENETICS
172, 172 (1997).
154. Hoffman-Andrews, supra note 11, at 655; see also Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, The Ethics of
Consent in a Shifting Genomic Ecosystem, 4 ANN. REV. BIOMEDICAL DATA SCI. 145, 146
(2021) (noting that “[s]everal analyses have demonstrated that participation in genetic research
is significantly biased toward individuals of European ancestry, and typically includes only a
small minority of those who identify as African, Asian, Latinx, or Indigenous”).
155. Bennett, supra note 133; see also Jennifer L. Caswell-Jin, Tanya Gupta, Evan Hall,
Iva M. Petrovchich, Meredith A. Mills, Kerry E. Kingham, Rachel Koff, Nicolette M. Chun,
Peter Levonian, Alexandra P. Lebensohn, James M. Ford & Allison W. Kurian, Racial/Ethnic
Differences in Multiple-Gene Sequencing Results for Hereditary Cancer Risk, 20 GENETICS
MED. 234, 236–37 (2018) (showing that among a racially diverse group of people who had
multiple-gene panel testing, more than one-third who were not white had a VUS result,
whereas one-quarter who were white did).
156. See Sherry I. Brandt-Rauf, Victoria H. Raveis, Nathan F. Drummond, Jill A. Conte &
Sheila M. Rothman, Ashkenazi Jews and Breast Cancer: The Consequences of Linking Ethnic
Identity to Genetic Disease, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1979 (2006).
157. Chanita H. Halbert & Barbara W. Harrison, Genetic Counseling Among Minority
Populations in the Era of Precision Medicine, 178 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 68, 71 (2018).
158. See Keolu Fox, The Illusion of Inclusion—the “All of Us” Research Program and
Indigenous Peoples’ DNA, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 411, 411 (2020).
159. See Hoffman-Andrews, supra note 11, at 655.
160. See Arjun K. Manrai, Birgit H. Funke, Heidi L. Rehm, Morten S. Olesen, Bradley
A. Maron, Peter Szolovits, David M. Margulies, Joseph Loscalzo & Isaac S. Kohane, Genetic
Misdiagnoses and the Potential for Health Disparities, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 655, 663–64
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patients of African or unspecified ancestry received misdiagnoses of
hypertrophic cardiomyopathy—a disease in which the heart muscle becomes
abnormally thick, making it difficult for the heart to pump blood, which can
lead to sudden death—due to incorrectly classified variants.161 Thus,
nonwhite patients are more likely to suffer unnecessary harms due to an early
pathogenic variant classification that is subsequently downgraded to VUS or
benign. As Lily Hoffman-Andrews explains, “[t]his means that all of the
challenges presented here are disproportionately likely to affect non-White
patients, a frustrating and unjust state of affairs.”162
This part explores the universe of possible legal solutions and posits that
either these individuals should be able to recover in some way for the injuries
they have sustained, or—ideally—a solution must be adopted that would
reduce the likelihood of these harms occurring in the first place. However,
any solution may require reliance on various legal regimes. Consequently,
the latter approach would not preclude retrospective relief for patients who
do suffer injury.
Medicine is always necessarily evolving, and the standard of care must
evolve with it. Thus, any potential solution must be careful to avoid
swallowing the practice of medicine in its wake. Situations like those
experienced by the Mathes family can be distinguished from classic cases on
the evolving standard of care, because in the former, the interventions that
the patients underwent were not yet the standard of care. In fact, for many
hereditary cancers, there is not yet a standard of care,163 often adding yet
another level of uncertainty to medical decision-making.164
In evaluating solutions, it is important to keep in mind the myriad of
players besides the patient. Among them are genetic testing companies,
physicians, regulators, legislators, and the public. Who besides the harmed
person should be obliged to help? Who should bear the burden of paying for
the harm? If we believe that, all things being equal, the patient should not be
the one burdened with the physical and financial harms, then how do we
allocate risk?
A. Tort Law Solutions
1. Current Tort Law Solutions Are Inadequate
Tort law is “the law of wrongs.”165 It addresses “legally recognized
wrongs of a particular sort.”166 Fault is the basis for liability in negligence
(2016) (explaining the need for sequencing the genomes of persons of diverse racial and ethnic
backgrounds).
161. See id. at 659.
162. Hoffman-Andrews, supra note 11, at 655.
163. See Lisa Campo-Engelstein, BRCA Previvors: Medical and Social Factors that
Differentiate Them from Previvors with Other Hereditary Cancers, 6 BIOÉTHIQUEONLINE,
no. 1, 2017, at 1, 3.
164. See Koch, supra note 151, at 679.
165. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 2 (2020).
166. Id.
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cases.167 However, the types of harms that the Mathes family members
suffered are not legally recognized; they have suffered harm in the absence
of fault. Cases like that of the Mathes family raise significant questions that
strike at the heart of the American tort system. When are harms
compensable? What is the purpose of compensation?
Tort law may be inadequate to address harms that arise when genetic
testing results are downgraded from pathogenic to a VUS, particularly when
individuals have already taken invasive and ultimately harmful action based
on the original test results. For one, negligence (or other) cases may be too
complicated for attorneys to take on. After the district court’s decision in
Williams, some have opined that “lawyers are still trying to wrap their heads
around what variant classification is.”168 One expert stated: “When I’ve
spoken to lawyers about some of the practices that are harming genetics
patients, they’ve all said, ‘Oh, no, this is too complicated. There are far easier
medical malpractice cases out there.’”169
However, withholding recovery from individuals who suffer medical harm
undermines public trust in medicine. Patients are expected to rely on genetic
test results to make life-changing decisions. This process is already rife with
uncertainty. At the time they undergo genetic testing, individuals are often
at their most vulnerable. They may be struggling with family members’
illnesses or deaths and may be concerned that they will have the same fate.
In these moments of uncertainty and vulnerability, they are asked to trust the
medical system, including the physicians who order genetic tests and the
companies that conduct them. And they are expected to trust that, if
something goes wrong, it can be fixed, or at least redressed.170
But as the director of the Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics
at the National Cancer Institute observed when interviewed about the Mathes
case: “It’s not so simple as ‘Doctor, do I have to worry or don’t I have to
worry?’ . . . . There is a continuum of risk.”171 In the absence of reliable
answers and without any remedy, patients may be reluctant to rely on medical
test results or even to undergo medical testing. This might have a snowball
effect, slowing the collection of genetic information that can inform research,
thereby making genetic tests less accurate. As one expert tweeted: “We have
to make choices about our bodies with incomplete information. Science is
an ongoing project, not a fait accompli. That’s true of #brca and it’s true of
health care in general.”172 Faulting patients for making certain decisions

167. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the
Fault in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 745 (2016).
168. Ray, supra note 134.
169. Id.
170. Others have noted that, generally, medical reversal erodes trust in the medical system.
See, e.g., Prasad et al., supra note 18, at 1675.
171. Marcus, supra note 1.
172. The Risky Body (@theriskybody), TWITTER (Dec. 23, 2019, 9:56 PM),
https://twitter.com/theriskybody/status/1209306801327558656
[https://perma.cc/YAH7JVTP].
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based on current medical information will hinder the advancement of
medicine.
Denying recovery to individuals who suffer medical harm, even in the
absence of negligence, may therefore result in the inequitable distribution of
risk. For one, withholding remedies from individuals who take medical
action based on genetic tests that are later downgraded may disadvantage
them for being proactive. In other words, the system encourages individuals
who receive a pathogenic (and presumably actionable) test result to refrain
from taking action in case those test results are later found to be incorrect.
However, on the whole, individuals who undergo medical and surgical
interventions based on genetic tests results do not do so out of ignorance or
as knee-jerk reactions.173 An alternative to being proactive—expecting a
patient to wait for conclusive results—could result in disease and even more
costly medical care.
Thus, our current legal regime effectively puts the moral “blame” on the
individual seeking genetic testing (who, in the case of BRCA mutations, is
often a woman). As one expert on BRCA mutations described, “[p]eople
with known deleterious [BRCA] mutation (like me) are often dismissed as
anxious, over cautious by physicians when asking legitimate questions about
family history and cancer risk.”174 A few hours later, she stated, “I hope for
a day where we can stop blaming women for facing decisions about”
BRCA.175
2. Tort Law Remedies
When a patient is harmed due to variant reclassification from pathogenic
to a variant of unknown significance, they have little legal recourse.
Common-law negligence simply falls short. Currently, legal rules do not
acknowledge the individuals who rely on up-to-date scientific information to
make complex and invasive medical choices, only to discover that those
interventions were unnecessary. Despite the fact that it seems that these
individuals should be entitled to redress—or be able to avoid risk of
unnecessary surgeries and interventions—the system seems to be
intentionally hostile to patients’ interests.

173. See, e.g., Andrea Downing (@BraveBosom), TWITTER (Dec. 23, 2019, 4:58 PM),
https://twitter.com/BraveBosom/status/1209231778445021185
[https://perma.cc/66KQF7NU] (“Consider nuance: patients need evidence about #BRCA to make informed decisions.
Instead of blaming our haste to jump into radical procedures or ‘dangers’ of genetic testing.
It’s about changing systemic problem rooted in data-sharing and lack of access. Big
difference.”).
174. Andrea Downing (@BraveBosom), TWITTER (Dec. 23, 2019, 5:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/BraveBosom/status/1209233472864210944
[https://perma.cc/N2WKQ9E8]. She continued, “[r]espectfully that’s the 99% of us that do not fall into the edge case
of this WSJ story.” Id.
175. Andrea Downing (@BraveBosom), TWITTER (Dec. 23, 2019, 10:13 PM),
https://twitter.com/BraveBosom/status/1209311169627865089
[https://perma.cc/CW2J76ND].
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As an initial matter, it may be useful to briefly consider the primary
theories of tort in an effort to address whether these theories may justify
redress, even if current tort rules would not allow it. To the extent that a
negligence claim could be applicable to variant downgrading after a patient
has undergone medical interventions, an economic theory of tort law—which
would seek to minimize the costs of injury—may justify redress. In contrast,
various theories of justice do not justify compensating these patients. In the
absence of wrongdoing, corrective justice, which holds those at fault
accountable, is inapplicable. The principle of retributive justice is similarly
inappropriate. Perhaps the principle of distributive justice would justify
compensating individuals who have undergone invasive medical
interventions based on genetic variants that are later reclassified, as it focuses
on the fair distribution of resources, including risk.176 In their analysis of
legal duties that might arise when laboratories reclassify a genetic variant,
Professor Jessica L. Roberts and Alexandra L. Foulkes recognize that
patients bear “a significant number of costs” in the context of variant
reclassification.177 Notably, with the advent of precision medicine, patients
are progressively more burdened by shifting risk.178
Tort law is generally described as having two main goals (or at least two
primary effects): deterring harms and compensating those who have been
injured by others.179 But deterrence principles, with their emphasis on fault,
have dominated the application of modern tort doctrine.180 In cases in which
individuals suffer medical harm in the absence of negligence, the focus on
deterrence becomes moot because of the absence of questions of fault and
wrongdoing. Rather, the focus shifts to redress for the individuals who are
harmed.

176. See Roberts & Foulkes, supra note 9.
177. Id. at 183 (arguing that “[s]hould courts opt to impose legal duties related to variant
reclassification, laboratories and ordering physicians will have to make updated information
available to all potentially impacted patients, not just those who develop symptoms”). Further,
with the evolution of the doctor-patient relationship and the advent of new and more advanced
technologies, patients also increasingly bear the burden of dealing with uncertainty. See Koch,
supra note 151, at 666 n.108 (“[T]he sociopsychological burden of uncertainty will be shifted
to patients. Paradoxically, the burden of uncertainty inherent in a probabilistic diagnosis will
be increased by the expectation that the purportedly ‘precise’ diagnosis will empower patients
by giving them the opportunity to make better-informed decisions about future treatment.”
(quoting Gil Eyal, Maya Sabatello, Kathryn Tabb, Rachel Adams, Matthew Jones, Frank R.
Lichtenberg, Alondro Nelson, Kevin Ochsner, John Rowe, Deborah Stiles, Kavita
Sivaramakrishnan, Kristen Underhill & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Physician-Patient
Relationship in the Age of Precision Medicine, 21 GENETICS MED. 813, 814 (2019))).
178. See Koch, supra note 151, at 666.
179. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 525
(2003). Professors Goldberg and Zipursky posit that deterrence and compensation are not the
goals of the tort system, but instead are the “beneficial effects of having tort law.” GOLDBERG
& ZIPURSKY, supra note 165, at 29. Rather, the purpose of tort is to redress wrongs.
180. See Benjamin Sundholm, Strict Liability for Genetic Privacy Violations in the Age of
Big Data, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 759, 774 (2019) (“Because fault principles dominate
contemporary tort theory, tort law’s deterrence goals have received a disproportionate amount
of attention relative to compensation aims.” (citing James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence
Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 377, 380, 404 (2002))).
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One potential solution is the establishment of a new negligence claim.
However, while courts have historically accepted novel negligence claims,181
doing so here is not a viable solution. Often, when a new tort is established,
it usually arises from a newly conceived duty. Here, it is difficult, based on
the considerations addressed in Part II.A, to determine what that duty might
actually be.
Alternatively, one could imagine proposing a strict liability regime for
circumstances in which patients suffer harm due to medical interventions
taken before a genetic variant is reclassified. Strict liability, or liability
without fault, has been defined as “liability that is imposed on an actor apart
from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without
a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise
reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence.”182 Expansion of strict liability
has been embraced by theorists and scholars such as Judge Guido Calabresi
in order to place “responsibility for injuries with the agent who is best
positioned to conduct an analysis regarding the cost of those accidents”183
and “who can most readily avoid the potential harms.”184 So, in a way, strict
liability may also have a deterrent effect, by making risky behavior more
expensive “and, as a result, making safer alternatives more desirable.”185
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that the general principle of the law
is “that loss from accident must lie where it falls, and this principle is not
affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument of misfortune.”186
In a sense, strict liability counteracts this principle.187 Rather, the doctrine
shifts initial liability to the injurer, rather than the injured.188 In elucidating
what he calls the “relational approach to tort law,” Professor Timothy D.
Lytton observed that “support for the tort system, despite its gross
181. And other negligence claims have been proposed. In 1985, Professor Marjorie
Maguire Shultz recommended “the creation of a distinct and independently protected interest
in patient autonomy.” Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice:
A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 223–24, 229 (1985). Similarly, Professor
E. Haavi Morreim has called for the establishment of a “distinct dignitary tort”—those harms
that are “caused by conduct that overrides patients’ autonomy,” treats them as less than human,
and denigrates them as human beings—for “serious deficiencies of informed consent.”
E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on
a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 74 (2003).
182. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534 (5th ed.
1984) (emphasis added). As a general rule, strict liability applies in three situations: (1) wild
animals, (2) abnormally dangerous activities, and (3) products liability. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts identifies three types of products liability claims: manufacturing defects,
design defects, and information defects. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2
(AM. L. INST. 1998).
183. Sundholm, supra note 180, at 792.
184. Roberts & Foulkes, supra note 9, at 187 (discussing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970)).
185. Sundholm, supra note 180, at 795.
186. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 87 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ.
Press 2009) (1881).
187. See Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259,
260 (1976).
188. See id.
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inefficiencies, arises largely from the belief that it clarifies matters of
wrongdoing and injustice in addition to providing compensation and
deterrence.”189 According to Professor Lytton, strict liability locates
wrongfulness in the outcome of the action, rather than the actor’s state of
mind (i.e., intentional torts) or the “inadequacy of a person’s conduct when
compared to reasonable behavior” (i.e., negligence).190
So, could laboratories or physicians have prevented the harm in cases like
those of the Mathes family? Perhaps, if the initial classification was not
based on sound scientific evidence. However, the holding in Belser suggests
that a testing company’s inappropriate reliance (or lack thereof) on existing
studies is “a failure of administrative oversight, not the exercise of discretion
in the practice of genetics.”191
As the authors of one study of the incidence of variant misclassification
predicted:
Due to the magnitude of impact that certain genetic test results may bring,
laboratory directors may feel a responsibility to not “overcall” variants.
Legal questions could arise if a BRCA1 variant was downgraded to benign
after previously being called pathogenic. Women may have performed
prophylactic surgery based on this result. It is unclear who, if any group,
is responsible for this event or if it is a natural risk of medicine in general.
For these reasons, it can be in the best interest of the laboratory and patient
to confirm that the laboratory has enough relevant data before they classify
a variant as pathogenic.192

If strict liability were to be extended to genetic testing companies in such
cases, it might spur them to ensure more caution in their variant classification
process to minimize subsequent reclassification. However, this potential
result may run counter to one of the commonly understood goals of strict
liability. Activities subject to strict liability are considered to be valuable
while posing inherent risks, such that the tort system compensates victims of
the manifestation of those risks, even if there was no way to prevent them.
Strict liability is generally imposed when potential liability cannot lead to
increased precautions. In the case of reclassification, genetic testing
companies may be incentivized to ensure more robust research to guarantee
adequate data that supports a likely pathogenic or pathogenic classification
before returning results to patients.193 However, imposing strict liability in
189. Timothy D. Lytton, Rules and Relationships: The Varieties of Wrongdoing in Tort
Law, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 359, 386 (1997).
190. Id. at 369.
191. Belser v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 16-0972, 2020 WL 6526084, at *7, *9 (D.S.C.
Nov. 5, 2020) (acknowledging “the difference between an administrative exercise of noting
the existence of scientific literature and a professional judgment as to whether the literature
has been sufficiently vetted to confirm its reliability and relevance”).
192. Macklin et al., supra note 87, at 349.
193. See Mersch et al., supra note 37, at 1267 (“Given the clinical implications of genetic
testing, accurate and timely variant classification is increasingly important for appropriate
long-term patient care. It is, therefore, critical that new information for variants in cancer-risk
genes be reviewed by testing laboratories in order to evaluate whether reclassification is
appropriate. This is done in an effort to ensure that patients with increased cancer risk receive
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these types of cases may induce genetic testing companies to be more careful,
thereby leading them to delay classifying variants until full and complete data
has been collected, in order to avoid potential liability. While the Mathes
family would have benefited from this shift, it might lead others who would
have undergone prophylactic interventions under the current regime to not
receive actionable results until it is too late.
Providing individuals who experience harm due to an inaccurate variant
classification with access to a strict liability claim serves two purposes. First,
it eliminates many of the “doctrinal barriers imposed by fault-based tort
law,”194 thereby increasing ability for individuals to be compensated for
harms. Second, a strict liability regime may influence genetic testing
companies to anticipate the potential downgrading of variants that had been
previously classified as pathogenic, thereby ensuring “that at least some form
of compensation—fiscal or otherwise—is available” to these individuals and
serving as “acknowledgement of the wrong they have suffered.”195
And while this may not be the type of fact pattern that strict liability was
historically intended to redress,196 it would not be the first time we’ve seen
arguments in favor of expanding the scope of strict liability. For example,
scholars have recommended it in the context of psychotherapists’ liability for
the release of imprisoned people with mental illness.197 And, significantly,
the development of strict liability doctrine in the context of products liability
was heavily influenced by the American Law Institute’s recognition, in its
restatements, of the need to adopt the doctrine in the case of defective
products.198
Despite the arguments in favor of expanding strict liability to address
circumstances like the one the Mathes family faced, doing so may have a
fatal flaw: strict liability still requires that the defendant cause harm to the

appropriate screening, risk-reducing surgical interventions, or both while those with lower risk
avoid unnecessary interventions.”).
194. Sundholm, supra note 180, at 796.
195. Id.
196. Further, predictive genetic tests are generally not considered “products”; rather, they
are defined as “services.” Ossorio, supra note 64, at 240 (“Courts have been unanimous in
refusing to apply products liability doctrine to professional services, including medical and
legal services. Product liability applies, however, to genetic tests sold as kits for use by parties
other than the manufacturer.”). Scholars have argued for a more consistent interpretation of
“product” that anticipates and includes emerging technologies, based on the policy objectives
underlying strict liability law. See David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of
“Product” Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 TORT & INS. L.J.
845, 887–89 (2000). However, Professor Ossorio observes that “the doctrine concerning
liability for medical products has evolved away from liability in the absence of fault.” Ossorio,
supra note 64, at 242 n.15. Thus, even if genetic tests fall under the definition of “products,”
individuals such as the Mathes family members may still be unable to recover without proving
wrongdoing.
197. See Psychotherapists’ Liability for the Release of Mentally Ill Offenders: A Proposed
Expansion of the Theory of Strict Liability, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 204, 239–40 (1977).
198. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 632–33 (1995).
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plaintiff.199 As demonstrated in Part II, causation is a difficult element to
prove in these cases because there is no recognizable wrongdoing.200
Professor Lytton’s conceptualization that strict liability requires wrongdoing
would undercut an application of the doctrine to our fact pattern. He argues
that “[t]he language of wrongdoing pervades negligence and strict liability
claims,” as reflected in the “sense of injustice” (in contrast to misfortune) in
certain tort claims.201
Faced with a case similar to that of the Mathes family, a judge may be
reluctant to find that an injustice has occurred. The physicians and laboratory
applied the most up-to-date scientific data and followed the standard of care
for returning genetic test results. Instead, what happened to these seven
family members may more aptly be categorized as an unfortunate and rare
confluence of events.202
B. No-Fault Compensation System
As Part III.A describes, relying on the tort system to redress the harm that
individuals suffer after a variant is downgraded is an inadequate approach.203
In contexts such as these, injured individuals may instead seek recovery
outside the tort system. While not universally available, in certain cases,
no-fault compensation systems have sometimes been implemented. No-fault
compensation systems simplify the process of recovery for plaintiffs while
limiting litigation costs and payments for defendants.
No-fault compensation schemes are frequently premised on a
specialty-court model, like the “vaccine court.”204 The National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program (NVICP) is administered through the Office
of Special Masters in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.205 The NVICP
permits individuals injured by vaccines to petition the federal government for

199. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION
15 (1980).
200. See supra Part II.
201. Lytton, supra note 189, at 385.
202. In an empirical study, Professors Richard L. Cupp Jr. and Danielle Polage found that
jurors hearing a case under negligence language (which “may draw on emotionally ‘hot’
notions of fairness and fault”) were more likely to find the defendant liable than jurors hearing
a case under the “cold” technical concepts of strict liability. Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle
Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 874 (2002). The study presents a “challenge to the notion that strict
liability is generally a pro-plaintiff doctrine under courts’ increasingly dominant approaches
to design and warning cases.” Id. Thus, applying strict liability instead of negligence may not
benefit potential plaintiffs like the Mathes family, as their claims may not result in liability for
the testing company that returned the misclassified results.
203. See supra Part III.A.
204. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (NVICP) established the vaccine
court. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42 U.S.C.).
205. See Vaccine Claims/Office of Special Masters, U.S. CT. OF FED. CLAIMS,
https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-program-readmore [https://perma.cc/HS2P-563Y]
(last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
OF TORT LAW
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compensation.206 Claimants present their medical records to the vaccine
court to demonstrate that, shortly after they were vaccinated, they developed
one of several adverse events listed in a “vaccine injury table.”207 A system
like the NVICP’s might similarly address harms such as those experienced
by the Mathes family. Harms inevitably arise in such circumstances, lawsuits
might be prohibitive, and it behooves the industry to fund a system to obviate
risk.208
States have also implemented no-fault compensation systems in some
circumstances in which causation is difficult to prove. The Florida
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA)
provides limited recovery, irrespective of fault, for infants who have
sustained a birth-related neurological injury.209 With exceptions, NICA
provides the exclusive remedy in cases in which an infant suffers such an
injury, and the physician who delivered obstetrical services in connection
with the birth participates in the program.210 The Florida Board of Medicine
requires that physicians who deliver such services pay into NICA unless they
fit into specific categorical exemptions.211

206. See id.
207. See Covered Vaccines, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccine-compensation/covered-vaccines [https://perma.cc/W6DU-7PKC] (last visited Nov. 7,
2022) (providing the most up-to-date vaccine injury table and explaining how to determine
whether an injury is covered).
208. Other examples of no-fault compensation systems include special victim
compensation funds, which provide compensation to victims of major catastrophes. These
include the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Trust, and One Fund Boston. See SEPT. 11TH VICTIM COMP. FUND, https://www.vcf.gov/
[https://perma.cc/A6UU-ZGSR] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022); Nanciann Regalado, Historic
NRDAR Settlement Reached for Deepwater Horizon Spill, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.doi.gov/restoration/historic-nrdar-settlement-reacheddeepwater-horizon-spill [https://perma.cc/Q4F5-YMGY]; Massachusetts Crime Victim
Compensation Antiterrorism Program for Bombing Survivors, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME
(July
29,
2016),
https://ovc.ojp.gov/funding/awards/2016-rf-gx-0002
[https://perma.cc/29WT-22N5]. These funds are often congressionally ordered and
administered. In many cases, to recover from these funds, plaintiffs must waive their rights
to sue.
209. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.301–766.316 (2022); CS/CS/SB 1786—Florida Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, FLA. SENATE, https://www.flsenate.gov/
Committees/billsummaries/2021/html/2450 [https://perma.cc/TMG5-QY6M] (last visited
Nov. 7, 2022). Virginia also enacted its Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act
in 1987. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5001 to 38.2-5021 (2022).
210. See FLA. SENATE, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT 2 (2021),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2021/1786/Analyses/2021s01786.pre.bi.PDF
[https://perma.cc/V7S2-SVCW].
211. Am I Required to Pay the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Association (NICA) Fee?, FLA. BD. OF MED., https://flboardofmedicine.gov/help-center/am-irequired-to-pay-the-florida-birth-related-neurological-injury-compensation-association-nicafee/ [https://perma.cc/L54Z-ZS3V] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022) (“You are required to pay the
NICA fee unless you meet the following exemption criteria per s. 766.314, F.S.:
• Resident physicians, assistant resident physicians and interns in postgraduate
training programs approved by the Board of Medicine
• Retired physicians who maintain an active license, but who have withdrawn from
the practice of medicine
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Finally, workers’ compensation is based on a system in which employers
pay into a workers’ compensation fund.212 Injured employees can recover
without having to prove the defendant’s fault, regardless of any comparative
negligence.213 This type of no-fault compensation system consists of “a
self-governed insurance/self-insurance program, rather than a specialty court
or nationwide compensation fund.”214 These plans are intended to “treat like
cases alike, offer fair compensation, and disburse compensation with
maximum efficiency and minimum administrative cost.”215
No-fault compensation has frequently been proposed to redress medical
injury as an alternative to traditional liability systems.216 Recognizing that
“with modern medicine’s capacity to alleviate disease, injury, and disability
comes significant risks that it may independently cause harm,”217 scholars
have concluded that “a form of no-fault is clearly feasible for at least some
medical issues” and “no-fault delivers benefits quite similar in value to tort,
but much faster and with far lower administrative costs.”218
Shifting the burden of responsibility to clinical laboratories would serve
multiple purposes. First, these companies are better positioned to take
precautions to avoid misclassification in the first place, and when
reclassification becomes necessary, they are in the best position “to
efficiently redress injuries” and to “internalize the costs of compensation or
shift those costs to society downstream.”219 In other words, individuals who
have already undergone invasive unnecessary medical interventions will not
also be expected to absorb the costs of decisions that have been made based
on results returned to them by genetic testing companies. Instituting a
•

Physicians who hold a limited license, as defined by s. 458.317, F.S., who do not
receive any compensation for medical services
• Physicians employed full-time by the Veterans Administration whose practice is
confined to VA hospitals
• Any licensed physician on active duty with the Armed Forces of the United States
• Physicians employed full-time by the State of Florida whose practice is confined to
state-owned correctional institutions and state-owned mental health facilities”).
212. See generally Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?: Workers Compensation and the
Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 119, 122 (1994).
213. See id. at 168–71 (describing the workers’ compensation no-fault system).
214. Leslie Meltzer Henry, Megan E. Larkin & Elizabeth R. Pike, Just Compensation:
A No-Fault Proposal for Research-Related Injuries, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 645, 648 (2015).
215. Id. at 645–46.
216. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & Peter J. Rankin, Administrative
Performance of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical Injury, 60 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 71
(1997). A no-fault compensation system also requires some level of administrative
responsibility and bureaucracy. That said, “because individual institutions can implement this
system voluntarily, the approach does not require the creation of a new centralized
bureaucracy.” Henry et al., supra note 214, at 657.
217. David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of “No-Fault”
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 227 (2001).
218. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 216, at 106. The authors analyzed Virginia’s and Florida’s
no-fault compensation systems for birth-related neurological injuries and concluded that they
“work[] successfully.” Id. “That is, premiums are collected, and claims are received,
investigated, and paid with not unreasonable results in an area that is very contentious in tort.
In this, our interviews and other observations accord with prior study.” Id.
219. Henry et al., supra note 214, at 654.
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no-fault compensation system might create incentives for laboratories “to
manage and mitigate risks by forcing institutions to internalize the financial
costs of . . . harms.”220
Under these types of insurance-like no-fault compensation systems,
however, compensation is generally received in exchange for an agreement
not to sue. Often, no-fault compensation funds were established to protect
companies, like BP in the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, from going
out of business due to tort liability. In contrast, as demonstrated in Part II, in
the cases like that of the Mathes family, there is little to no threat of tort
liability against the physicians who ordered the genetic test or the clinical
laboratories who conducted the test.221 Thus, there is little to incentivize
genetic testing companies to voluntarily “buy in” to an insurance program to
redress reclassification of genetic variants, since there is a little chance that
those who are injured due to the misclassification would be able to sue in the
first place.222 Any no-fault compensation system for harms that arise from
prophylactic medical decisions based on information that later turns out to be
incorrect should include incentives for companies to “buy in.” Further, most
no-fault compensation systems address physical harms alone, rather than
emotional damages, including pain and suffering. Therefore, a classic
no-fault system may be insufficient to address the types of harms at issue in
the present case.
C. Regulatory Solutions
Current regulations are similarly inadequate to address harms that arise
when individuals take prophylactic action before genetic variants are
reclassified. There is a dearth of regulation related to variant classification
because “[v]ariant classification has traditionally been treated as ‘art of
medicine’ rather than science.”223 As explained in a review of genetic variant
classification and its impact on test accuracy, “[a]rt of medicine falls under
clinician licensure rather than Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA) or College of American Pathologists (CAP)
accreditation.”224
Despite the 2015 ACMG guidelines’ determination that a 90 percent
certainty in either direction was sufficient to describe a variant as either likely
pathogenic or likely benign, “sufficiently large orthogonally validated truth
sets are not publicly available to actually quantify laboratories’ certainty of
variant classifications; therefore, the certainty concept remains aspirationally
220. Id. at 657.
221. See supra Part II.
222. Further, no-fault compensation systems like the NVICP intend to serve a dual role:
encouraging companies to create and manufacture vaccines and supporting the public to get
vaccinated. A no-fault compensation system for genetic tests may not serve these same goals.
Although encouraging companies to develop tests based on sound scientific evidence is an
important objective, it is not clear that our policies should advance taking action on genetic
tests given current levels of uncertainty.
223. Giles et al., supra note 20, at 288.
224. Id.
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qualitative.”225 Any regulatory solution to the “harm without negligence”
problem needs to incentivize accuracy to protect patient safety, ensuring that
test results are supported with robust data and research.
Under the authority of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act226
(FDCA), the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates medical
“devices,” which are defined as instruments and related articles intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or
intended to affect a bodily structure or function.227 Depending on how a
genetic test is produced and marketed, it can be regulated as either an in vitro
diagnostic device (IVD) or a laboratory developed test (LDT). Laboratory
developed tests are IVDs designed, manufactured, and used within a single
laboratory.228 According to a 2008 study, IVDs subject to FDA review make
up only about 1 percent of the commercially available genetic tests.229
IVDs that are not LDTs must comply with the FDA’s medical device
regulations, which require clearance or premarket approval before they can
be legally used.230 Thus, FDA regulations establish “several layers of
oversight” for these types of diagnostics.231 In contrast, the FDA does not
hold LDTs to the same standards. While the FDA has taken the position that
LDTs are medical devices and are therefore within the agency’s jurisdiction,
it has historically exercised enforcement discretion over these tests.232 Thus,
the FDA has not generally required clinical laboratories to comply with IVD
requirements for their LDTs.233 According to one report, “[t]he fact that a

225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399).
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF
LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LDTS): DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD
AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES (2014),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/frameworkregulatory-oversight-laboratory-developed-tests-ldts [https://perma.cc/3LPZ-KR7X]. The
definition of LDT has always been somewhat murky. See Turna Ray, Labs Scramble After
FDA Loosens Regulations on Some Tests, MODERNHEALTHCARE (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/supply-chain/labs-scramble-after-fda-loosensregulations-some-tests [https://perma.cc/A9X8-YFB3] (“The FDA defines LDTs as tests that
are developed, validated and performed by the same lab. But there have been times when the
lab industry has launched tests expecting to fall under FDA’s enforcement discretion only to
be told that they aren’t LDTs and require premarket review.”).
229. See Jennifer A. Gniady, Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Protecting
the Consumer Without Quashing a Medical Revolution, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2429, 2438
(2008).
230. See Rachel E. Sachs, Regulating Intermediate Technologies, 37 YALE J. REG. 219,
244–46 (2020) (describing the FDA’s process for approving new medical devices).
231. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRs., supra note 72.
232. See Ray, supra note 228 (noting that the FDA typically uses its “enforcement
discretion” with regard to LDTs, and has “left it up to [the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services] to oversee labs under federal standards outlined under the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments (CLIA)”).
233. See Gail H. Javitt & Katherine Strong Carner, Regulation of Next Generation
Sequencing, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9, 14 (2014); Patricia J. Zettler, Jacob S. Sherkow & Hank
T. Greely, 23andMe, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Future of Genetic Testing,
174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 493, 493–94 (2014).
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medical professional is involved in ordering genetic tests and providing the
results helps move them out of range of FDA regulation.”234
Whether a genetic test is classified as an LDT or an IVD has enormous
ramifications for how they are regulated. Devices are determined to be safe
and effective based on three factors: analytic validity, clinical validity, and
clinical utility.235 Analytic validity asks, among other things, whether the
test works and whether it is, in fact, testing the correct person’s data.236
Clinical validity asks whether the presence of the mutation sheds light on
whether the person’s health will be affected, or whether there is a valid
association between having a variant and having a health implication.237 And
clinical utility inquires whether this knowledge is actionable—i.e., will it
actually improve health outcomes?238 In the case of IVDs, the FDA requires
proof of both analytic and clinical validity. The fact that a physician has
ordered the test appears to—at least in practice—remove genetic tests out of
the FDA’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that such tests are not necessarily
more accurate or reliable than other IVDs. Dr. Michael F. Murray of Yale
University has explained that “[t]he FDA, rather than choosing to specifically
insert itself, has decided that having a licensed medical professional order the
test is enough protection for the consumer—patient—whatever you want to
refer to that person as—so that [the FDA doesn’t] have to specifically step
in.”239
Instead, companies like Myriad are regulated by the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments of 1988240 (CLIA). The Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) regulate laboratory testing (except research)
performed on humans in the United States.241 CLIA governs all clinical
laboratories operating in or returning test results to individuals in the United
States, where clinical laboratories are defined as any laboratory that tests
human specimens to provide information for the diagnosis, prevention,
treatment of any disease or impairment, or assessment of health.242
CLIA certification is required for clinical laboratory testing on specimens
collected for health purposes (i.e., for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment
of disease or impairment) using minimum quality standards, where research

234. Ike Swetlitz, Genetic Tests Ordered by Doctors Race to Market, While
‘Direct-to-Consumer’ Tests Hinge on FDA Approval, STAT (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/03/16/genetic-tests-fda-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/YK5T9M59].
235. See Gniady, supra note 229, at 2442–46 (describing these three factors).
236. See id. at 2442–43.
237. See SARAH A. ROBINSON, ALISON R. CARTER & DAVID A. BRINDLEY, THE
CHANGING REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (2021),
https://www.raps.org/RAPS/media/news-images/Feature%20PDF%20Files/21-8_Robinsonet-al.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDF4-TJMD] (noting that clinical validity is an “assessment of
how well a test can diagnose or predict a clinical condition”).
238. See Gniady, supra note 229, at 2446.
239. Swetlitz, supra note 234, at 4.
240. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 note, 263a; see 42 C.F.R. § 493.
241. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.1.
242. See id. § 263a(a).
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is returned and specimens have a unique identifier.243 Unlike the FDA
regulations, CLIA only requires proof of analytic validity.244
In 2014, the FDA indicated that it was considering premarket review of
LDTs by publishing draft guidelines involving a risk-based approach.245
However, in 2016, it became clear that the new guidelines would not be
finalized.246 The continued delay in announcing a proposed policy might
reflect the inherent difficulty of determining clinical validity for genetic tests.
Recently, The Pew Charitable Trusts called for Congress to step in to
authorize the FDA to review LDTs, citing the risks that failure to do so
presents to patients.247 Specifically, such legislation should allow the “FDA
to require that higher-risk LDTs be reviewed for both analytical and clinical
validity—both of which are key criteria for ensuring test accuracy, reliability,
and usefulness—before they’re used on patients.”248 It opined: “LDTs serve
an important role in medicine and public health, but they must be held to the
same standards for accuracy and reliability that apply to tests manufactured
by device companies. This approach requires risk-based oversight from FDA
and increased transparency from the entire diagnostics industry.”249

243. See Susan M. Wolf, Pilar N. Ossorio, Susan A. Berry, Henry T. Greely, Amy
L. McGuire, Michelle A. Penny & Sharon F. Terry, Integrating Rules for Genomic Research,
Clinical Care, Public Health Screening and DTC Testing: Creating Translational Law for
Translational Genomics, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 69, 73 (2020).
244. See Thorogood et al., supra note 131, at 839 (“The Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments regulations that govern clinical laboratories in the United States address analytic
validity but do not impose mandatory standards for determining the clinical validity of a
particular genetic test.”); see also Michael J. Malinowski & Robin J.R. Blatt,
Commercialization of Genetic Testing Services: The FDA, Market Forces, and Biological
Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1211, 1230 (1997) (describing “home-brew” tests, which are
tests that are performed in-house by its manufacturer and marketer; home-brew tests are
services, not products, and are not subject to products liability law); Ossorio, supra note 64,
at 243 (arguing that marketing the test as a home brew allows companies to avoid routine FDA
review and noting that laboratories that perform home-brew testing are subject to regulation
and oversight under CLIA; however, because CLIA does not yet recognize genetic testing as
a specialty, it contains no regulations designed particularly to assess the accuracy and the
reliability of genetic tests).
245. See Letter from Sally Howard, Deputy Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Tom
Harkin, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. & Pensions (July 31, 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDia
gnostics/UCM407409.pdf [https://perma.cc/C28P-TE9M]. However, the FDA has since
announced that it will delay this plan. See Sheila Kaplan, FDA Puts off Closing Lab-Test
“Loophole,” Leaving Decision to Congress and Trump, STAT (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/18/fda-lab-test-loophole/
[https://perma.cc/2NM2L9VG].
246. And, in August 2020, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services announced
that the FDA could not require premarket review of LDTs without notice-and-comment
rulemaking, effectively limiting any FDA authority over such tests. See Ray, supra note 228
(“However, noting the growth and changing marketing practices within the lab industry, the
FDA from time to time has tried to regulate LDTs in a piecemeal fashion through guidance.”).
247. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 72, at 1 (“Congress should pass legislation
that would increase the transparency of the market and authorize FDA to review them based
on their risks to patients.”).
248. Id. at 4.
249. Id.
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The FDA’s reluctance or inability to regulate LDTs and ensure not only
analytic validity but also clinical validity and utility may be partly to blame
for the ordeals faced by the Mathes family and other patients.250 Because the
FDA exercises its enforcement discretion, LDTs “exist in a loophole, and
most are not subject to any analysis to gauge their clinical validity before
marketing and use.”251
The FDA is best positioned to ensure that, if a company is going to report
a variant as pathogenic, it is, in fact, pathogenic.252 Professor Rachel Sachs
has explained that “without FDCA regulation, the question of how accurately
Myriad’s test is able to predict a woman’s risk for cancer is unknown.”253
The FDA, when it regulates medical devices, looks at particular tests and
whether they work.254 In contrast, CLIA is more focused on the operations
of the laboratory.255 Thus, had the FDA exercised its enforcement authority
over the genetic test that the Mathes family members used, both analytic
validity and clinical validity might have been ensured, and the variant might
have been correctly classified before results were returned to the patients.
The lack of regulation of genetic testing laboratories was highlighted in
Williams.256 Professor Wagner has explained: “[Williams] underscores a
problem we have with ensuring adequate quality of genetic testing
laboratories . . . . Americans currently place heavy reliance upon CLIA
accreditations of laboratories for consumer protection. I think this reliance
is misplaced.”257 And Professor Cook-Deegan has stated that Williams
“really illustrates how sloppy things can be in reporting a genetic test result
in the chain of communication from a lab to the doctor ordering the test, to
the doctor taking care of a patient, and to the patient and the family,”

250. See Christi J. Guerrini, Jennifer K. Wagner, Sarah C. Nelson, Gail H. Javitt & Amy
L. McGuire, Who’s on Third?: Regulation of Third-Party Genetic Interpretation Services,
22 GENETICS MED. 4, 4 (2020) (“Government regulation is a traditional mechanism for
addressing potential harms of products and services made available to the public, and it is
especially prevalent in the health sector given the special responsibilities of governments to
protect public health.”).
251. Sarah F. Sunderman, The Need for Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing
in the United States: Assessing and Applying the German Policy Model, 12 WASH. U. GLOB.
STUD. L. REV. 357, 368 (2013); see also Guerrini et al., supra note 250, at 7.
252. See Clayton et al., supra note 51, at 835 (“Laboratories are the best situated to
re-examine both previously reported results and the underlying genomic data to the extent that
they retain them.”).
253. Rachel Sachs, The FDA Takes Steps Toward Regulation Laboratory-Developed Tests,
BILL OF HEALTH (Aug. 4, 2014), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2014/08/04/the-fdatakes-steps-toward-regulating-laboratory-developed-tests-2/ [https://perma.cc/L9T6-QB79].
254. See Rachel Sachs, Diagnostic Method Patents and Harms to Follow-on Innovation,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1370, 1378–79 (2013) (explaining the FDA’s jurisdiction over diagnostic
tests).
255. See id. at 1379 (describing CLIA’s authority over laboratory operations).
256. See supra Part II.B.1.
257. Turna Ray, In Williams v. Quest, State Supreme Court Leaves Room
for Plaintiff to Argue Ordinary Negligence, GENOMEWEB (July 3, 2018),
https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/williams-v-quest-state-supreme-courtleaves-room-plaintiff-argue-ordinary [https://perma.cc/8NRU-ME7E].
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concluding that “[c]learly, there was a breakdown here, [and] the regulations
are not very clear on that.”258
However, it may be argued that the harm that arises in these types of cases
is not actually the harm that the FDA is equipped to address when regulating
medical devices. For example, harm does not arise from a blood test or cheek
swab administered to collect a patient’s biospecimen. Rather, as explored in
Part II.B, the patient’s harm is a result of the unnecessary medical
intervention that the patient underwent based on the genetic test results (e.g.,
a double mastectomy that the patient did not, in fact, need based on that
patient’s particular level of risk).259 This determination of risk is not the type
of risk that the FDA has historically addressed in determining the safety or
quality of a device.260
Despite these concerns, appropriately tailored FDA oversight of LDTs
may help address the challenges of standardizing the classification of
genomic variants and how genetic testing laboratories report results to the
patients’ treating physicians. Standardizing the evidence required to classify
variants as pathogenic, a VUS, or benign could go a long way in ensuring
trustworthy and reliable test results, and potentially avoiding unnecessary
medical interventions in response to earlier variant misclassifications.
D. Intellectual Property Solutions
Regulation, however, might not be the (entire) answer. To begin with,
Professor Sachs identifies the concerns with overregulating “intermediate
technologies” like certain genetic tests.261 Putting up regulatory barriers to
going to market may stifle needed innovation that, if left less regulated,
would make the technology more advanced and reliable. She discusses
Myriad’s reduction in VUS classifications over time, despite the fact that the
fundamental technology did not change, concluding that its ability to
improve and refine the test in a favorable regulatory climate ultimately
improved its therapeutic value to patients.262 She states:
The improvements in Myriad’s tests over the years are a success story of
an intermediate technology. Myriad was able to bring its test to market
when the product was still an intermediate one: it had some predictive
value, but significant improvements were still needed, and were foreseen.
It had clinical value at the time for some patients, but for nearly half of
women receiving the test, their results were inconclusive. However, that

258. Ray, supra note 134.
259. See supra Part II.B.
260. See A History of Medical Device Regulation & Oversight in the United States, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. (June 24, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overviewdevice-regulation/history-medical-device-regulation-oversight-united-states
[https://perma.cc/643M-EKWG] (noting that, in 1976, Congress amended the Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act to give the FDA the power to “provide reasonable assurance of the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices”).
261. See Sachs, supra note 230, at 233 (calling Myriad’s test a “paradigmatic example of
an intermediate technology”).
262. See id.
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very act of coming to market was necessary to enable Myriad to construct
the database of genetic test results it used to bring down the VUS rate. If
regulators had required a lower VUS rate before Myriad came to market, it
is not clear when (if ever) Myriad would have been able to aggregate the
kind of information necessary to meet that goal. 263

The same might be true of collecting enough data to ensure that, when a
patient receives a pathogenic test result, the result is accurate, reliable, and
actionable.
The lack of credible variant classification can largely be attributed to
certain companies’ (like Myriad’s) virtual monopoly on genetic data and the
failure of clinical laboratories and researchers to share data.264 Myriad
remains the market leader for genetic tests, and it still, in many ways,
exercises near monopololistic authority in breast cancer screening for clinical
cases.265 Significantly, Myriad, the company that performed the Mathes
family’s BRCA tests, benefits from its history of patent and trade secret
protection for the data that it has amassed over the course of many years.266
While the company’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents were invalidated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 2013,267 the private (and secret) proprietary database
of test results and health outcomes it had built up since at least 2005 enabled
the company’s continued monopoly in the market for such tests. This
database includes all past patient information and test results. The advantage
of protecting trade secrets is that such protections are not time-limited, in
contrast to patent protection, which only grants a temporary monopoly.268
Generally, states develop their own trade secret laws, but almost all have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act269 (UTSA) as its basis for trade secret
263. Id. at 231.
264. Myriad has claimed that it can offer patients unparalleled speed and accuracy, most
likely due to its “vast and unique interpretive database, derived from a patent-based U.S.
testing monopoly going back to the late 1990s and involving more than one million patients.”
John M. Conley, Robert Cook-Deegan & Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, Myriad after Myriad: The
Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH 597, 607, 612, 614 (2014) (“Myriad has used
its patent-based monopoly as the sole BRCA 1 and 2 test provider to develop, at its own cost,
an extensive database that relates VUSs to phenotypes, details the frequency of VUS in various
populations, and includes genetic studies on patient families.”); see also Robert Cook-Deegan,
John M. Conley, James P. Evans & Daniel Vorhaus, The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing:
Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 585, 585 (2013).
265. See Sharon Begley, As Revenue Falls, A Pioneer of Cancer Gene Testing Slams Rivals
with Overblown Claims, STAT (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/29/brcacancer-myriad-genetic-tests/ [https://perma.cc/9T8V-U9MU] (noting that even three years
after its key patents were invalidated, Myriad still had about 85 percent of the U.S. market for
BRCA testing).
266. See id. (describing how Myriad’s “main competitive edge was its proprietary
database,” which contained much more data than what its competitors had access to).
267. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596
(2013).
268. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
269. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 628–830 (2021); see also
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (“[T]he term ‘trade secret’ means all forms and types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information . . . whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically,
graphically, photographically, or in writing if—(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable
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protection, which provides for injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys’ fees
if violated.
Because, until 2013, Myriad maintained its patent monopoly and was
therefore the only entity that had conducted the BRCA1 and BRCA2
screening tests, it has the information necessary to understand the clinical
significance of the mutations, particularly VUS. Myriad’s patents were
therefore “data-generating,” allowing the company to collect and create data,
thereby extending its monopoly.270 In other words, while companies besides
Myriad can now offer diagnostic tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2, they may not
have the information that correlates these mutations with the probability of
actually developing cancer.271 Thus, “Myriad’s test is the gold standard,”
and “[e]veryone goes by what they say.”272 It is often alleged that companies
like Myriad hoard data, making “evaluation of data by outside parties
impossible.”273
In the absence of data sharing among genetic testing companies, the
likelihood of initial misclassification is much higher. One study published
in the New England Journal of Medicine found that “the interpretation of the
importance of the same variant by multiple clinical laboratories may differ,
so that at least one interpretation must be wrong and could therefore lead to
inappropriate medical intervention.”274
The stakes for individuals like members of the Mathes family or Nancy
Seeger are particularly high; extending trade secret protection in these cases
imposes identifiable harm on patients. For the Mathes family, the “lab said
it made the change as more people with the same variant were tested and
added to Myriad’s database,” and “[t]he new analysis showed that specific
measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, the public.”).
270. Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
377, 379 (2017). Myriad’s actions here are not unique to genetics. As Professor W. Nicholson
Price has explained, companies “use the interlocking effects of patents and
difficult-to-reverse-engineer trade secrets to maintain monopolies long past patent expiration.”
W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1611, 1612 (2017).
271. See Price, supra note 270, at 1630 (“Although competitors promptly rushed to offer
BRCA1/2 genetic tests, and although the testing process was readily duplicable, Myriad
maintained—and still maintains—the lion’s share of the genetic testing market . . . . Over the
years of Myriad’s monopoly, it collected genetic information on well over a million women,
including family histories of cancer incidence.”).
272. Marcus, supra note 1.
273. Turner et al., supra note 77, at 430 (“[M]ost commonly, variants were reclassified due
to new proprietary evidence not available to all testing laboratories. The proprietary nature of
internal variant databases makes evaluation of data by outside parties impossible. This data
should be incorporated into publicly available databases, such as ClinGen, to allow for data
aggregation and quicker resolution of rare variants. Ideally, the data should include
pathogenic and benign variants.”).
274. Heidi L. Rehm, Jonathan S. Berg, Lisa D. Brooks, Carlos D. Bustamante, James
P. Evans, Melissa J. Landrum, David H. Ledbetter, Donna R. Maglott, Christa Lese Martin,
Robert L. Nussbaum, Sharon E. Plon, Erin M. Ramos, Stephen T. Sherry & Michael
S. Watson, ClinGen—The Clinical Genome Resource, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2235, 2235
(2015).
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variant might carry a lower risk of cancer than one categorized as pathogenic,
which increases a person’s chance of getting a disease.”275 Had Myriad been
involved in more data sharing prior to returning the results to the Mathes
family, they would have received accurate results much sooner. The
increased competition (and ability to obtain second confirmatory testing)
may therefore be the impetus for updated (and more accurate) results.276
However, “[h]ealthy competition among isolated entities is no longer
sufficient to drive our understanding of human variation, and patient care
may be compromised when data are not shared.”277 Thus, limiting data
monopolies through increased data sharing appears to be a potential solution
to ensure that variants are correctly classified the first time. Arguably, harms
like those suffered by the Mathes family, as well as those suffered by
individuals whose initial VUS results are upgraded to pathogenic (but who
are unable to take medical action until it is too late) would be significantly
less common if there were more sharing of data and larger, more
comprehensive data sets.278
Public efforts to collect and share this data are ongoing. For example, the
National Institutes of Health’s National Center for Biotechnology
Information launched ClinVar, a “public archive for clinical laboratories,
researchers, expert panels, and others to archive their classifications of
variants across all genes.”279 These “public variant databases are
increasingly relied on during genomic testing to clarify the clinical
significance of variants in support of diagnosis or targeted treatment.”280
ClinVar has been billed as a “one-stop shop for disease genes.”281
The ClinGen consortium then works to develop publicly available tools,
procedures, and working groups to advance the field of genetic variant
classification.282 ClinGen evaluates genes involved in diseases such as cystic
fibrosis and breast cancer and employs “a rating system to show how strongly
any particular variant has been linked to a particular disease,” thus “creat[ing]
a measure of trust for genetic results.”283
However, many companies do not share variant classification data or
contribute to databases like ClinVar, despite numerous calls from

275. Marcus, supra note 1.
276. Evidence has shown that 17 percent of the variants with clinical interpretations
submitted by more than one laboratory had conflicting interpretations. Rehm et al., supra note
274, at 2240.
277. Id. at 2235–36.
278. See Hoffman-Andrews, supra note 11, at 655 (“Functional studies of genes and
variants, and population-level data with accurate phenotyping, will improve variant
classification and reduce uncertainties.”).
279. Giles et al., supra note 20, at 290.
280. Thorogood et al., supra note 131, at 838.
281. Monya Baker, One-Stop Shop for Disease Genes, 491 NATURE 171, 171 (2012).
282. See Giles et al., supra note 20, at 291.
283. Yong, supra note 16.
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organizations such as the ACMG and the AMP to do so.284 For example, the
lab that tested Nancy Seeger’s mother does not submit to ClinVar.285
Further, on a practical level, data sharing may not be as straightforward as
we would hope. There exist multiple databases with inconsistent and
variable data from which it is difficult to extract reliable information.286 As
one author observed, “[r]ecent studies have documented that different
laboratories may produce discordant interpretations of the same variant.”287
And, even when data is shared, testing results may still be misclassified. In
other words, “concordance does not guarantee accuracy.”288
CONCLUSION
Although this Article explores various legal protections to redress harms
that occur after a patient has undergone unnecessary medical interventions
based on variants previously classified as pathogenic, tort remedies are
generally unsatisfactory.289 Our intention should be to reduce harms by
limiting the risk of unnecessary medical actions in response to variant
misclassification, rather than to reallocate and/or spread that risk.
An ideal solution would reduce the likelihood of harms occurring in the
first place by improving reliability and accuracy—both in the genetic tests
themselves and in the ability of physicians to interpret the tests and their
clinical significance. Thus, FDA regulation coupled with increased data
sharing may go a significant way toward ameliorating the “harm without
negligence” problem in clinical genomics. However, mistakes may still
occur. Thus, any solution may require simultaneous reliance on multiple
legal regimes. Consequently, a solution may also be to adopt a strict liability
approach for genetic tests, thereby allowing individuals, when they are
284. See Ray, supra note 52. Just before this Article went to print, Myriad Genetics
announced that it would begin submitting hereditary cancer risk variants to ClinVar in 2023.
Turna Ray, Myriad Genetics to Submit Hereditary Cancer Risk Variants to ClinVar in 2023,
GENOMEWEB (Nov. 1, 2022), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/myriadgenetics-submit-hereditary-cancer-risk-variants-clinvar-2023
[https://perma.cc/NDV7N6VL] (“[B]y sharing information on hereditary cancer risk variants, the ‘new Myriad’ is
attempting to come out from under the shadow of the landmark Supreme Court case that took
away its dominance over BRCA1/2 testing and its much criticized decision to maintain its
variant data as a trade secret.”).
285. See Ray, supra note 52.
286. See Burke, supra note 49, at 1247–48 (calling for the creation of a national database
to collect data from multiple sources).
287. Id. at 1247 (“One study of 9 laboratories found that the concordance rate for
interpretation of 99 variants spanning the full range of classification categories was only 34%.
After consensus discussions, concordance increased to 71%, underscoring the need for
judgment, and, therefore, the potential for disagreement in interpreting data on variant
pathogenicity.” (footnotes omitted)).
288. Giles et al., supra note 20, at 290.
289. There may also be clinical practice solutions to the “medical harm without negligence”
problem, some of which have been discussed in this Article. For example, increased focus on
genetic literacy among physicians may help improve decision-making based on genetic test
results. See Part II.B.2. Likewise, modification of the ACMG guidance to include stricter
rules regarding initial variant classification could potentially reduce the incidence of later
reclassifications.
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harmed as a result of prophylactic action before a variant is later reclassified,
to seek redress. Prioritizing regulatory solutions over tort law solutions may
reduce some of the alternative problems that could arise under solely a
compensation scheme. While the “harm without negligence” problem may
seem intractable in many ways, the law offers approaches to enable
individuals to obtain better information upon which to make potentially
life-changing medical decisions. And at least some of these solutions290 may
have value in other—perhaps even nonmedical—contexts.

290. Importantly, however, FDA regulation of LDTs to address the particular concerns
related to the downgrading of previously pathogenic mutations to uncertain or benign will not
fix the “harm without negligence” problem in medicine wholesale.

